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Purpose 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the events and problems of the banking system 
that led to the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. The paper examines the history of banking in the 
United States and identifies some of the more significant factors that persuaded American 
bankers, politicians, academicians, and others that reform ofthe banking system was necessary. 
A discussion of the banking panic of 1907 illustrates some of these factors. Finally, the basic 
provisions of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 are presented and discussed. 
Introduction 
Pre-twentieth century America had a fear of centralized power and a distrust of moneyed 
interests. This dominated contemporary politics and, consequently, prevented the creation of a 
central bank which appeared to be the embodiment ofthose fears. However, the existence of a 
fractional reserve banking system without a lender of last resort that could provide reserves to the 
banking system in the event of a banking panic was a serious problem. Nationwide banking 
panics in the nineteen and early twentieth centuries were frequent (occurring in 1837, 1857, 
1873,1884,1893, and 1907). The severe panic of 1907 convinced many bankers, politicians, 
academicians, and others that a central bank was necessary to prevent future banking panics and 
to bring order to financial markets. 
The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 was the product ofa long and sometimes bitter political 
struggle which resulted in a compromise. As many contemporary and modern students of the 
history of banking in the United States point out, the Act was a response to a troubled banking 
sector which was characterized by financial panics and general instability of banks. Bank 
suspensions were a common occurrence and especially numerous after major banking panics as 
indicated by the following data from the "Historical Statistics of the United States" (pg. 636): 
Bank Suspensions: 1871-1910 
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For instance, the panic of 1893 caused 496 bank suspensions that year and shook the banking 
system for the next five years. 
The provisions of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 cannot be fully understood without 
studying the nature of banking prior to the Act, the contemporary problems and issues that were 
pressing on the various stakeholders, or the banking reform movement of the early 1900s. 
Consequently, this paper will examine the history and problems of banking in the United States 
under the National Banking Act of 1864, the banking panic of 1907 and the problems it caused, 
and the reform process that led to the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. 
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Literature Review 
The history of banking in the United States has generated considerable interest. The 
following is a selected review that focuses on discussions of banking problems that led directly to 
the formation ofthe Federal Reserve. 
Bray Hammond conducted a penetrating study of banking in the United States prior to 
1865 in "Banks and Politics in America From the Revolution to the Civil War." In this study, he 
provided an interesting discussion of the American fear of central banks which delayed the 
banking reform for some time after the weaknesses of the banking system became apparent. 
He contends that pre-twentieth century America had a fear of centralized power which was 
evident in the significant influence of Jacksonians, supporters of President Andrew Jackson, who 
stood behind "the humbly born and rugged individualists who were gaining fortunes by their own 
toil and sweat, or wits, [who] were still simple Americans ... , anti-monopolistic, anti-
governmental, but fraught with the spirit of enterprise" (Hammond, pg. 328). They attacked the 
Bank of the United States because they believed it was a symbol of oppression, tyranny, monied 
power, aristocracy, wealth, privilege, and monopoly. The attack emphasized the Wall Street 
businessmen's jealousy of the federal Bank, their dislike of the federal Bank's restraint on bank 
credit, the Bank's interference with states' rights, the popular identification ofthe Bank with the 
aristocracy of business and the agrarian antipathy toward the federal Bank (Hammond, pg. 329). 
Thus, in 1836, President Jackson, the leader of the Jacksonian trend, allowed the charter of the 
Second Bank of the United States to expire. "Destruction of the Bank ended federal regulation of 
bank credit and shifted the money center of the country from Chestnut Street to Wall Street" 
(Hammond, pg. 329). 
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The lack of organization within the banking system was one of the most important 
problems prior to the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. Thibaut de Saint Phalle, in "The Federal 
Reserve, An Intentional Mystery," described the banking system after the demise ofthe Second 
Bank ofthe United States as being a period of chaos. Thousands of banks were issuing 
thousands of different types of bank notes, making the methods of payments difficult and 
inefficient. Phalle pointed out some of the most significant characteristics of the lack of 
organization. They included scattered reserves over a large area which prevented quick pooling 
of funds in times of panic, lack of central clearing facilities which hindered a quick transfer of 
funds, and absence of any lender of last resort. 
Pyramiding of reserves was a major problem associated with the lack of organization and 
was also identified by Phalle. However, Oliver M.W. Sprague provides an interesting and more 
detailed discussion of this subject in the "History of Crises under the National Banking System." 
He concluded that allowing banks to keep their reserves on deposit in other banks, perhaps in 
other cities, caused the banking system to fail in meeting the severe strain of crises. He indicated 
that the banks were always weaker than they appeared and, therefore, less able to cope with 
financial difficulties. 
Among the most important conclusions drawn by Sprague was his belief that the country 
was in need of a lender of last resort. He believed that all the banking panics under the national 
banking system would have been easier to manage if the New York banks were able to increase 
loans to meet demands of depositors for money. His discussion of the usefulness of 
clearinghouses supports this belief. After an extensive study of several banking panics during the 
latter part of the nineteenth century, Sprague concluded that banks' organized effort through 
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clearinghouses made financial crises less severe. He also recognized that such organized effort 
was not always easy to achieve due to each bank's desire to keep its independence and 
sovereignty. Thus, in his opinion, creation of a lender of last resort was possible only by 
imposing a central authority that would induce the interbank cooperation in times of crises as 
well as oversee the banking structure during normal times. 
Another major problem of banking under the national banking system was the problem of 
an "inelastic supply of currency." In "A Monetary History of the United States," Friedman and 
Schwartz explain that because of the banks' fractional reserves, any overall attempt by the public 
to raise its currency holdings would drain bank reserves which in turn would cause banks to 
contract their outstanding liabilities by a multiple of the loss in reserves. This led to some bank 
suspensions and threatened a chain reaction resulting in a bank panic. The two authors also 
explain the contemporary view that the money stock should conform to the needs of trade. The 
view was that the supply of money should increase during good economic periods in order to 
facilitate the increased economic activity and should decrease when the economy was not 
performing so well - it should be elastic. Friedman and Schwartz claim that this view was one of 
the most dominant considerations during the banking reform process of the early 1900s and is 
reflected in its incorporation in the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. 
As Friedman and Schwartz indicate, the weaknesses of the banking system were 
recognized in the contemporary banking literature. However, the fear of centralized banking 
accompanied by various political interpretations of the existing problems delayed banking 
reform. The dramatic experience of the banking panic of 1907 induced many Americans to put 
their fears and disagreements aside and create a banking system that would foster and correspond 
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to the country's economic growth and the need for a more stable and cooperative banking 
environment. 
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1Vature of Banking in the United States Prior to the 
Federal Reserve Act of 1913 
Between 1836 and 1864 
The fear of centralized banking that was present in the United States during this period 
was the motivation behind President Andrew Jackson's decision to allow the charter of the 
Second Bank of the United States to expire in 1836, eliminating any central authority overseeing 
the banking structure. By thel860s, the United States banking system consisted of thousands of 
individual banks each issuing its own notes. The notes varied in value and depended on the 
financial strength and trustworthiness of the issuing bank. This required some means of clearing 
the notes of different banks. Some larger banks attempted to facilitate clearing by requiring 
smaller banks to maintain redemption deposits with them. Banks which chose not to maintain 
such deposits ran the risk of having all of their notes returned for redemption in specie. This was 
a powerful force restricting the issue of unsound notes 
National Banking System 
An important step in banking reform was achieved by the National Banking Act of 1864. 
The Act was an attempt to organize American banking through the formation of national banks. 
The provisions of this Act were modeled after those of the New York State Banking Act of 1838 
and the Louisiana State Banking Act of 1842. 
The underlining principles of the National Banking Act were almost the same as those of 
the New York State Banking Act of 1838 (Hammond, pg. 562, 727-728). Prior to the New York 
Act, a special state charter was required for bank organization. As a result, monopoly and special 
7 
-. 
-
favoritism were widespread, and it was felt that competition would relieve these problems. The 
act of 1838 provided the State of New York with a banking law embodying the principle of 
competition, known asfree banking. The National Banking Act extended the principle ofJree 
banking to the entire nation. Any group of five or more people who could meet the minimum 
capital requirements contained in the law were granted federal charters. Generally, applicants 
had to demonstrate some need for a bank and to posses the proper character and intentions. 
The Louisiana law required all banks to separate long- and short- term loans, while the 
issuance of long-term debt was restricted. Short-term loans, usually ninety-day commercial 
paper, were not renewable and sanctions were imposed against those who failed to pay their 
debts or who required extended periods to liquidate their loans. The provisions of the National 
Banking Act were not as strict as those ofthe Louisiana Act. However, it did prohibit banks 
from engaging in certain activities. The real estate investments by banks, for instance, were 
allowed only for their own needs for banking facilities while all other long-term non-commercial 
operations were forbidden. 
The National Banking Act authorized national banks to issue a new type of bank note 
secured by United States government bonds. Issuing banks deposited the required amount of 
government bonds with the Comptroller of the Currency, a new agency created by the Act to 
oversee national banks. The Act limited the issue of notes by a national bank to its paid-in 
capital. This provision was intended to prevent banks from using specie to buy state government 
bonds on margin and then using the bonds to issue notes equal to the par value of the bonds. The 
newly-issued notes would then be used to complete the payment for bonds purchased on credit. 
The surplus of note issue could be used to repeat the same process over again. This practice 
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enabled banks to maintain a circulation equal to twenty or thirty times their paid-in specie capital 
(Hammond, pp. 619-620). 
The National Banking Act also attempted to standardize the reserves held against bank 
deposits by making them uniform with respect to the size and location of the national banks. In 
most states, reserves were either unregulated or low percentages of total deposits were required. 
Some banks had so little specie in their reserves that they were unable to meet even the slightest 
increase in public's demand for currency. With respect to location of a national bank, reserve 
requirements were highest for banks in New York City and lowest for country banks. Banks 
outside New York were permitted to count their deposits in other banks as part of their reserves. 
Despite the fact that banks were required to have reserves, often the amounts held in bank 
vaults or on deposit with other banks were not available or sufficient to meet sudden demands 
without falling below the required reserve minimum. This was the case because banks tended to 
loan out as much money as they could, thus always being near their minimum reserve ratio 
(required reserves/total deposits). Banks were induced by the profit motive to approach their 
minimum reserves but were forbidden by law to fall below them. Therefore, knowing that the 
punishment for violations of reserve requirements could be the closure of the bank by the 
Comptroller of the Currency, banks were forced to contract credit to gain liquidity (to gain 
necessary cash for payment to demanding depositors) in times of stringency. 
A major criticism of the national banking system was that it did not provide a mechanism 
for interbank cooperation. The only cooperation between the national banks was through the 
requirement of the National Banking Act that every non-New York bank designate a redemption 
agent for its notes (a bank willing to exchange its notes for specie) in New York City or some 
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other large city. This is one of the reasons New York became the primary financial center in the 
United States, especially because banks in other large cities were required to name their own 
redemption agents in New York. The requirement lowered the redemption costs to note-holders 
but it was of very little use in times of crises. 
Another important criticism of the National Banking Act was that it did not cover all the 
existing banks in the United States but only those with national charters. By 1913, the number of 
state banks was more than twice that of national banks as indicated by the following data from 
the "Historical Statistics of the United States" (pp. 624, 626, and 630): 
No. of national banks No. of state banks 
1913 7,467 19,197 26,664 
Note: Number of state banks also includes the private banks because they were not segregated from other 
banks between 1896 and 1946. 
In 1865, Congress attempted to suppress state banks by placing a prohibitive tax on state bank 
note issues. However, after several years of decline, state banks came to realize that note issues 
were becoming less important relative to demand deposits as a means of payment. Consequently, 
state banks continued to occupy an important position in American banking. 
Despite its ineffectiveness, the National Banking Act of 1864 determined the nature of 
banking from 1864 to 1913. Among the most important aspects ofthe Act are the philosophy of 
independent unit banks, the type of note issue, and the reserve structure. These aspects 
composed the core elements of the banking reform discussion in the early 1900s. 
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Problems of Fractional Reserve Banking Under the 
National Banking System 
The banking problems prior to the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 fall into two categories: 
(1) problems of organization or lack of it and (2) problems of the inelasticity of note issue. The 
first problem took many forms including scattered reserves, lack of central check-clearing 
facilities, and the absence of a lender of last resort. The second problem dealt with the inability 
of the circulating currency to expand in the event of bank runs. 
Organizational Problems 
Some organizational features of the National Banking Act prevented smooth operation of 
the financial system. The national banking system was not really a system at all but rather a 
loose body of independent banks responsible only to themselves and only for themselves. Such 
structure prevented any united action among the banks when abnormal conditions prevailed. 
Therefore, as Thibaut de Saint Phalle points out, excessive individual bank independence played 
a significant part in the spread of bank panics (pg. 47). In time of panic, each bank scrambled to 
protect its own liquid position by attempting to collect large amounts of cash in order to resist a 
run. A run on one bank induced other banks to take a similar defensive approach but the fixed 
amount of cash in the system necessarily frustrated this effort. 
The reserve system written into the National Banking Act was considered defective by 
many. A pyramiding of reserves was caused by allowing banks to deposit a share of their reserve 
requirements with banks in major cities but could still list those deposits as reserves. 
Furthermore, the banks in major cities deposited a share of their reserves with major banks in 
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-New York City. Consequently, the actual level of available reserves was much lower than what 
it was nominally required. The system was always weaker than it appeared and less able to meet 
any increase in demand for hand-to-hand currency relative to demand deposits. 
Some New York banks, in order to increase their share of interbank deposits, paid interest 
on demand deposits. This practice appeared to be a source of trouble since reserve deposits 
became concentrated in a few banks (Sprague, pp. 20-24). As Sprague points out, such banks 
"were directly responsible for any disturbance in the New York money market, which was due to 
the use of these funds, and also for any failure to meet demands for their return to banks in the 
rest of the country" (pg. 20). The banks engaged in this practice were obliged to lend out the 
money to obtain a return with which to pay the interest. They saw profit opportunities due to 
return rates exceeding the interest charge they were required to pay to attract deposits and, 
therefore, profited on the margin between the two rates. The demand deposits obtained in this 
manner were generally loaned on the stock exchange in the form of call loans. These loans were 
presumed to be almost perfectly liquid since the funds were available on call. 
Often, after a period of stability, banks approached their minimum reserve requirements 
as they attempted to maximize profits. Because of reserve pyramiding and individual bank 
isolation during a crisis it became impossible for banks to redeem a large amount of deposits 
without some credit contraction. This led to two separate problems: (1) a stringency placed on 
country banks affected all banks because of the fractional reserve system and (2) stringencies 
tended to snowball since no effective means of interbank cooperation existed. When country 
banks called deposits from their correspondent banks in cities other than New York, those banks 
were often forced to call deposits from New York. Banks subject to calls were forced to restrict 
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credit if they lacked free reserves. They were reluctant to go below their minimum required 
reserves to meet this sudden demand because of the legal sanctions which might be imposed by 
the Comptroller of Currency. Unless the circumstances were very severe, banks usually did not 
violate their reserve requirements. Thus, the only recourse was a credit contraction. The second 
problem deals with the lack of cooperative arrangement through which strong banks could come 
to the aid of weaker banks, therefore, stopping the scramble for cash. The reserves were too 
scattered to be of general use. Instead, in most cases, the panic spread from weaker to stronger 
banks as the distrust of banks was propagating. Because of the development of clearinghouses, 
however, things were not quite as bad as they might have been. In both 1873 and 1907, it is 
probable that the crises would have been worse had not New York banks come to one another's 
aid. The clearinghouses allowed some cooperation during panics and, therefore, convinced many 
people that more cooperation would improve the operation of the financial sector. 
The typical operations of clearinghouses were to clear checks and drafts and transact 
other interbank business. However, during crises they took on added importance. In times of 
stringency, they issued clearinghouse loan certificates based on the assets of member institutions 
which were used in place of currency in interbank clearings. Thus, bank reserves were increased 
by the amount of lawful money (gold coins and certificates and silver coins and certificates) 
ordinarily tied up in clearing procedures. While the loan certificates could not be counted as 
required reserves, they freed cash by serving as a substitute in interbank payments (Sprague, pp. 
45-53). 
During the panics of 1873 and 1907, New York banks pooled their reserves to meet the 
demand for currency. In 1873, they did so by forming the New York Clearing House (on 
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September 20, 1873) which issued clearinghouse loan certificates. In later years, banks were 
reluctant to cooperate and they failed to do so in both 1884 and 1893. Pooling, however, was 
accomplished again in 1907 because of the pressure exerted on New York bankers by J.P. 
Morgan, the embodiment of financial power and one of the strongest financiers of the era. The 
cooperative actions during panics as well as the occasional reluctance with which banks engaged 
in them impressed many people and, consequently, influenced later banking legislation. 
Accompanied by the lack of central check-clearing facilities which hindered the quick transfer of 
funds among banks in different parts of the country, these events emphasized the need for a 
central authority to oversee and regulate banking activities. 
Fractional Reserves 
The second major problem with the banking system prior to 1913 was an inelastic supply 
of currency or, as Friedman and Schwartz explain, the absence of effective convertibility between 
currency and deposits (pg. 168). Hand-to-hand currency was composed of national bank notes, 
u.S. Treasury Notes, gold coins and certificates, silver coin and certificates, and other subsidiary 
currency. The amount of silver currency, both coin and certificates, was fixed as were u.S. 
Treasury Notes. Gold coin and certificates were allowed to grow as the amount of monetary gold 
grew. Subsidiary coins and national bank notes were slightly flexible because they were allowed 
to grow but still had to conform to the maximum limit under the law. The elasticity problem, 
however, did not concern the long-run growth of the money supply but rather its short-term 
expansion and contraction. The problem was that when the demand for loans and currency 
increased in good economic times, the amount of cash available in the system could not be 
increased to meet the needs of consumers and businesses. Conversely, the system had no 
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operating mechanism to shrink the currency supply when the economy was performing poorly 
(Phalle, pg. 48). 
In each crisis, the demand for currency could not be met without drawing down reserves 
because, in the short run, national banks were not able to expand the supply of national bank 
notes. In turn, this forced banks to contract their outstanding liabilities by a multiple of the loss 
in reserves and, therefore, reduced the total amount of money available to be held. 
The problems of fractional reserve banking under the national banking system became 
the dominant issues of banking reform. The inelasticity of the stock of money and the lack of an 
effective reserve system or mechanism for cooperation began the trend toward a more structured 
form of organization. This was later opposed by the belief of many Americans in a free and 
independent banking system. For the purpose of illustrating the problems of the national banking 
system as well as understanding the motivation for and purpose of the Federal Reserve Act of 
1913, the following section briefly examines one of the more important financial crises, the 
banking panic of 1907. 
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The Banking Panic of 1907 
-
Bank run 
Source: Historical Beginnings ... The Federal Reserve 
"On extraordinary occasions," wrote David Ricardo, "a general panic may size the 
country, when everyone becomes desirous of possessing himself of the precious metals as the 
most convenient mode of realizing or concealing his property - against such panic banks have no 
security [under]' .. any system" (Encyclopedia, pg. 45). In a financial panic, fear leads to sudden 
and enormous withdrawals of deposits from banks and to wholesale selling of various financial 
assets for cash. People bailout of a system they fear will crash and, by doing so, either cause the 
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disaster or enlarge it. A panic is a sudden scramble for liquidity. Unable to sell their assets 
quickly, banks cmIDot possibly honor their contractual liabilities during a panic and, therefore, 
they must default on their debt obligations, causing the banking system to become insolvent. In 
most instances, banking panics occur at the onset of economic downturns which led to their 
association with crises and depressions. Generally, banks suspended convertibility of deposits 
into currency in unison, meaning that they temporarily refused to honor their contractual 
agreements to redeem their debt for cash on demand. The panic of 1907 followed a pattern 
similar to other panics. 
The decade prior to 1907 was generally very prosperous. A mild two-year economic 
contraction that ended in 1904 interrupted the advance in mid decade. However, this was 
followed by a strong expansion that featured industrial growth accompanied by rapid growth of 
the money stock and an advance in the stock market. By May 1907, the economy reached a 
cyclical peak and business activity entered a period of contraction which lasted for about a year. 
These events are reflected by the real and money income curves in the chart on the following 
page. 
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Cllart 1 
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Money Stock, Income, Prices, and Velocity, in Reference 
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Source: Monetary History of the United States. pg. 136 
Until the beginning of 1907, both curves reflect an upward trend, but as they enter the first 
quarter of the year, they begin to flatten out and finally tum downward in the second quarter. 
Similarly, the money stock curve has an upward trend all the way into the second quarter and 
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then it sharply turns downward. Both price indices, implicit and wholesale, reflect and upward 
trend in prices until the second quarter, however, the wholesale price index better reflects the fall 
in prices during the economic downturn than does the implicit price index curve which flattens 
out during that period. 
The economic decline was gentle until October when a panic seized the banks. As a 
result, banks generally refused to payout currency or specie to depositors on demand. Not only 
did banks fail, but the economic contraction intensified. Thus, the banking panic of 1907 divided 
the economic contraction into two parts. The first part was the period between May and 
September in which there were no obvious signs ofreal distress. Prices continued to rise (as 
indicated by the wholesale price index curve in Chart 1), production in some lines flattened out 
but did not decline seriously, freight car loadings behaved similarly, bank clearings held fairly 
steady, no drastic rise in the liabilities of commercial failures, and the only significant change 
was the reversal in gold movements from net imports to net exports. The second part of the 
contraction was after the October panic and it showed clear signs of severity. Production, freight 
car loadings, bank clearings, and the like all declined sharply, while the liabilities of commercial 
failures increased sharply. 
From May until September, some decline in the money stock was evident, but no bank 
runs occurred during this time. In October, however, banks came under severe pressure. The 
public ran on them, demanding currency in exchange for deposits. The banks sought to increase 
their currency holdings to meet their depositors' demands. With both, the public and banks 
scrambling for liquidity, the total money stock declined by five percent in five months. This is 
also reflected by the sharp downturn of the money supply curve during the second half 0 f 1907 
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-in chart 1 on the previous page. Prices collapsed on the stock market as banks called in loans 
used to finance security holdings. 
The first signs of panic surfaced in October 1907. On October 14, five banks which were 
members of the New York Clearing House and three outside banks required assistance from a 
group of clearinghouse banks. On October 21, the third largest trust company in New York, the 
Knickerbocker Trust Company, "began experiencing unfavorable clearing house balances," a 
problem that was connected with the banks that were initially in trouble (Friedman, pg. 159). 
The next day, the Knickerbocker Trust Company was suspended by the Clearing House. The 
suspension occurred after considerable debate among the members as the articles from the New 
York Times in Appendix A indicate. Friedman and Schwartz argue that if the Knickerbocker 
were helped, the further crisis developments might have been prevented (Friedman, pg. 159). 
Since the entire credit structure appeared to be in danger, the Trust Company of America and the 
Lincoln Trust Company were given assistance when they began experiencing difficulties on 
October 23 and 24 respectively which saved them from failing. However, the general alarm 
outside New York could not be prevented. 
Between October 21 and October 23, while the heavy runs on the New York trust 
companies were occurring, the New York Clearing House banks had to furnish currency required 
by the trust companies as well as ship currency to banks in the rest of the country for use there. 
In order to aid the Clearing House, Secretary of the Treasury, George Cortelyou, deposited $25 
million with the chief central reserve city banks in New York on October 24. The aid provided 
the banks with the funds for local withdrawals. Between October 19 and October 31, Cortelyou 
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deposited $36 million in New York banks. Also, $28 million had already been deposited mainly 
in banks outside New York between August 28 and October 14. 
A decisive stt!p ta curb the panic was 
mdertakcll by f. Pierp(lIIt A1orSilll. 
Source: Charteredfor Progress, pg. 109 
However, New York was still threatened 
with panic. Loans were difficult to obtain and 
stock market prices collapsed. On October 24, 
J.P. Morgan, one of the most powerful 
financiers of the era, organized a money pool of 
$25 million in order to prevent a further price 
decline on the stock exchange. Some leading 
banks and financiers subscribed to that pool. 
Next day, another pool of $10 million was 
formed. The local runs slowed down by the end 
of the week but alarm had already spread throughout the country. 
In response to the demand for currency by country banks who held deposits in New York, 
the New York Clearing House began issuing clearing house loan certificates on October 26. 
Fearing a drain on their reserves, the New York banks immediately began restricting the 
convertibility of deposits into currency. In previous panics during the 1800s, substitutes for 
currency were issued. Some of these included clearinghouse loan certificates issued to banks for 
payments to each other, small clearinghouse checks and certificates, cashiers' checks, and 
manufacturers' pay checks. The restriction pushed the currency to a premium over deposits. The 
premium reached a high of four percent (4%). This meant that every dollar of cash was worth 
$1.04 in bank deposits or that an individual was willing to give up one dollar worth of bank 
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deposits in order to obtain $0.96 in cash. Deposits became a less desirable asset because of 
distrust of banks and because deposits were no longer so useful for transaction purposes. This 
economic phenomenon was termed "hoarding of currency" by Oliver M.W. Sprague (pg. 276). 
The restriction of payments by the New York banks quickly spread to banks throughout the 
country. The restriction period ended in January, 1908. 
Interpretation of Events in 1907 
The most common interpretation of the banking panic of 1907 is that the panic and 
restriction of payments transformed a fairly mild economic contraction into a severe one. This 
interpretation motivated the monetary reform of the time that culminated in the Federal Reserve 
Act in 1913 (Friedman, pg. 163). Friedman and Schwartz, while recognizing that the bigger and 
stronger N ew York banks might have postponed restriction of payments by heavy and prompt 
lending to the weaker banks and trust companies and by supplying the currency needs of banks 
outside of New York, defend the relatively early restriction of payments. They believe that the 
restriction was a "therapeutic measure" which prevented the contraction from becoming even 
more severe and much more prolonged than it was (Friedman, pg. 163). Weak banks failed but 
such failures did not cause a chain reaction. Only a few banks failed because of temporary 
illiquidity. "Restriction of payments thus protected the banking system and gave time for the 
immediate panic to wear off, as well as for additional currency to be made available" (Friedman, 
pg. 167). Based on Friedman's and Schwartz's interpretation, the early restriction of payments 
helped prevent widespread bank failures, cut short a possible major deflation, and kept the 
maximum decline in the stock of money to less than eight percent (Friedman, pg. 167). 
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In the "History of Crises Under the National Banking System," however, Oliver M.W. 
Sprague argues that the restriction of payments was a "discreditable step [because it] was taken 
when the New York banks were much stronger than on other occasions and when prospects for 
securing additional funds were far more promising" (pg. 261). Sprague criticizes the New York 
banks because they delayed the issue of clearinghouse loan certificates and resorted to restriction 
of payments, while their own reserves were still sufficient (Sprague, pg. 273). Sprague believes 
that early assistance to the Knickerbocker Trust Company might have prevented any distrust in 
the soundness of the banking system. At the same time, he does not blame the failure of the 
clearinghouse authorities to aid this third largest trust company in New York because the 
Knickerbocker was not a member of the New York Clearing House (Sprague, pg. 253). 
Friedman and Schwartz identify two reasons for high vulnerability of the banking system 
in 1907 to a shift in the liquidity preferences: (1) the ratio of deposits to currency (DIC) had been 
growing steadily and (2) the ratio of deposits to banks' reserves (DIR) had been rising irregularly 
and slowly until about 1898 and then it accelerated (Friedman, pg. 164). These occurrences are 
represented in the following chart by the deposit-reserve ratio and deposit-currency ratio curves. 
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Chart 2 
The Stock of Money and Its Proximate Determinants, and 
Treasury Cash, 1897-1914 
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Source: Monetary History of the United States, pg. J 75 
"The rise in the ratio of deposits to reserves intensified the effect of any attempted shift on the 
part of the public to currency" (pg. 65). It made banks more susceptible to failure through runs 
because the extent to which they could satisfy the increased demand for currency diminished as 
the ratio of deposits to reserves increased. Consequently, banks were more prone to strengthen 
their cash positions at the slightest sign of possible demands on them (Friedman, pg. 165). 
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-The Reform of the Banking System 
The Aldrich-Vreeland Act 
Named for Senator Nelson W. Aldrich and Representative Edward B. Vreeland, this 
temporary act (1908) dealt with the problem of how to provide enough currency quickly to satisfy 
the demands of the public when it wanted to convert large amounts of deposits into cash. To do 
so was critical for the system because if total currency (high-powered money) could not be 
expanded rapidly the withdrawal of it from the banks would deplete their reserves as depicted by 
the high-powered money curve during the second half of 1907 in chart 2. By a sort of reflex 
action, this would make banks reduce their liabilities and so reduce the total means of payment 
(deposits plus currency) by a multiple amount. "Short-period 'elasticity' in one component of the 
money stock -currency- was therefore desirable in order to prevent undesired 'elasticity' in the 
total money stock" (Friedman, pg. 169). 
The Aldrich-Vreeland Act permitted banks to join together in groups to form National 
Currency Associations which were empowered to issue emergency currency. The banks would 
deposit certain approved assets (commercial paper and bonds) with the association. Limits 
would be placed on the amounts of currency that could be created and the notes would have to 
be retired promptly once the emergency ended, a process to be encouraged by taxes on notes. 
The emergency provisions of the Aldrich-Vreeland Act were used only once, at the outbreak of 
World War I, before the Act expired on June 30, 1915. On that occasion, the act successfully 
provided "an effective device for solving a threatened interconvertibility crisis without monetary 
contraction or widespread bank-failures" (Friedman, pg. 172). 
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Another very important clause of the Aldrich-Vreeland Act provided for the appointment 
of a National Monetary Commission which served as the incubator for the Federal Reserve Act. 
Senator Nelson Aldrich was the Chairman and Representative Edward Vreeland was the Vice-
Chairman of the eighteen-member congressional body. Through hearings and many special 
studies, the commission undertook an exhaustive examination of the monetary system and 
possible remedies for its deficiencies. In 1912, the Commission issued a report to Congress 
recommending a plan of reform. The Commission's proposals for a central bank were highly 
contentious politically (Johnson, pp. 17-18). After extensive debate, the Federal Reserve Act 
was passed on December 23, 1913. The new system was very similar in general structure to and 
identical in many details with the specific plan of reform recommended by the commission 
(Friedman, pg. 171). Prior to the 1912 report by the Commission, Senator Aldrich proposed a 
bill whose similarities with the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 are quite apparent. 
The New Aldrich Bill of1911 
In 1911, Senator Aldrich proposed a new bill for creation of a National Reserve 
Association with a paid-in capital of$100 million. The Association would be wholly owned by 
subscribing banks and would have fifteen regional districts. The board of directors of each 
district's branch were to be selected by local associations of banks. Even though the head office 
charged with overseeing the district branches was going to be located in Washington D.C., the 
government would not be represented on the board of this new institution. All national banks 
would be required to become members, while the state banks could chose to join or not, as they 
saw fit. The new bill appealed to the banking community by emphasizing that the National 
Reserve Association would function as a national clearinghouse (White, pg. 94). On one 
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occasion, senator Aldrich said that "the organization proposed is not a bank, but a cooperative 
union of all banks of the country for definite purposes and with very limited defined functions. It 
is, in effect an extension, an evolution of the Clearing House plan modified to meet the needs and 
requirements of an entire people" (White, pg. 94). As the composition of the board of directors 
conveys, small banks were given a voice in the selection of directors, while the weight of votes 
of large banks depended on their subscription or contribution to the association's stock (White, 
pg. 95). One of the branches' responsibilities was to rediscount notes and bills of exchange 
endorsed by members on agricultural, industrial, or commercial transactions of twenty-eight days 
or less maturity. The purpose of this provision was to "impart sufficient elasticity to the currency 
according to the principles of the real bills doctrine" (White, pg. 95). The bill forbade 
discounting of bills drawn to carry stocks, bonds, or other investment securities with the purpose 
of dissolving the relation between banking and the stock market (White, pg. 95). 
The new Aldrich Plan was rejected and, in Thibaut de Saint Phalle's opinion, that was 
due to several reasons: (1) the absence of any real government influence over the system, (2) the 
proposal to allow the banks to include notes as reserves, (3) a uniform discount rate, and (4) 
centralization of the National Reserve Association's administration. Another important reason 
deals with the political circumstances: the newly-elected Democratic Congress was strongly 
opposed to centralized control of the banking system. Many members of Congress perceived 
Aldrich as the spokesman for Wall Street bankers which reduced the credibility of Aldrich's 
arguments (Phalle, pg. 50). Even though the Aldrich Bill never became law, many of its features 
were later included in the Federal Reserve Act. 
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Soon after his election, President Woodrow Wilson took an active interest in the 
preparation of a banking reform bill and called a special session of Congress in the Spring of 
1913 largely to deal with banking legislation. Fear of control by Wall Street on one hand and too 
much government control on the other required reconciliation. Eventually, the bill of Virginia's 
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Representative Carter Glass and a 
Senate version of it resulted in a 
compromise that received President 
Wilson's signature on December 23, 
1913 as the Federal Reserve Act. The 
legislative process was complicated and 
involved numerous political leaders, 
bankers, and academicians. 
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The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 
This legislation established a new banking structure under the supervision of the Federal 
Reserve Board and twelve district Federal Reserve Banks. The purpose of the act was clearly 
stated in its introductory section: 
"To provide for the establishment ofthe Federal Reserve Banks, to furnish an 
elastic currency, to afford means of rediscounting commercial paper, to 
establish a more effective supervision of banking in the United States, and for 
other purposes" (The Statutes, Vol. XXXVIII, pg. 251). 
Eugene N. White, in "The Regulation and Reform of the American Banking System, 1900-
1929," lists the main provisions ofthe Act of 1913 (pp. 97-98): 
1. Every member bank was required to contribute six percent of its capital and surplus to 
the Federal Reserve Bank (one half was to be paid in and the other half was on call). 
2. State-chartered member banks had to conform to the minimum capital requirements 
of national banks. 
3. Reserve requirements on demand deposits established by the National Banking Act 
were lowered to eighteen percent (18%) for central-reserve-city banks, fifteen percent 
(15%) for reserve-city banks, and twelve percent (12%) for country banks. With 
respect to time deposits, the new reserve requirement was reduced to five percent (5%) 
for all classes of banks. For a brief time, part of these reserves could be carried in 
vault cash, but eventually they had to be deposited with the Federal Reserve Bank 
where they earned no interest. 
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4. Member banks were forbidden to have a deposit in excess often percent (10%) of 
capital and surplus with a nonmember bank. 
5. Member banks were examined twice per year by the Comptroller of the Currency and 
were subject to special examination on the discretion of the Federal Reserve Bank. 
6. All member banks had the privilege of rediscounting notes, drafts, and bills of 
exchange at the Federal Reserve. Financial instruments used to carry stocks or bonds, 
except those of the u.s. government, were excluded. The maturity of the instruments 
discounted could not exceed ninety days (except in cases of agricultural bills which 
were allowed a maximum six-month maturity). Notes or paper for firms or individuals 
which were worth more than ten percent (10%) of the bank's capital and surplus were 
prohibited. Bank acceptances which were based on import or export of goods and had 
maturities of no more than three months were discountable as long as they were not 
worth more than fifty percent of a bank's capital and surplus. 
7. Member banks were required to deposit, at par, checks and drafts drawn upon any of 
the depositories of the Federal Reserve Banks with the Federal Reserve Bank. The 
Federal Reserve Banks also became the acting clearing houses for their members. 
8. The act established a mechanism for gradual retirement of national bank notes in order 
to avoid lowering of prices of bonds which were used to secure those notes. 
The Act provides an elastic supply of currency which was viewed as a deficiency of the previous 
system. Now, as business activity grew, the money supply could expand as well as contract once 
the demand for currency decreased thus preventing periodic panics and runs on banks. However, 
as it is evident from the banking panics of the Great Depression, this provision of the Act did not 
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work in solving the currency inelasticity problems as it was intended by the authors of the Act. 
Another important provision of the Act was the centralization of bank reserves which pooled "the 
system's reserves for common use in periods of credit stringency" (Phalle, pg. 54). 
These provisions pleased many in the banking community as indicated by the excerpts 
from the New York Times dated December 24 and 25, 1913 in the Appendix B. This is 
reinforced by the fact that two hundred and thirteen (213) banks applied for membership in the 
new Federal Reserve System during its first day, December 24, 1913. 
Federal Reserve SYstem under the Act 0(1913 
The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 provided for the establishment of twelve Regional 
Federal Reserve Banks located in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Cleveland, Richmond, 
Atlanta. Chicago, St. Louis, Minneapolis, Kansas City, Dallas, and San Francisco. 
-
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The structure of the initial Federal Reserve System is represented by the following chart: 
Federal Reserve System, 1913 
I Federal Reserve Board I 
I Federal Advisory Board I 
Federal Reserve Banks 
Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Cleveland, Richmond, Atlanta, Chicago, St. Louis, 
Minneapolis, Kansas City, Dallas, San Francisco 
- The stock of each Federal Reserve Bank was held by the member banks of its district. 
Each district bank had a board of directors serving three-year terms and each district bank 
selected one person to serve on the Federal Advisory Board which met four times a year in 
Washington D.C. The Federal Reserve Act granted power to every Federal Reserve Bank to 
establish discount rates which could vary among the districts. However, all district rates had to 
be approved by the Federal Reserve Board in Washington D.C. The district banks were also 
charged with deciding whether or not to make loans to individual member banks. 
The Federal Reserve Board consisted of seven members which included the Secretary of 
the Treasury, the Comptroller of the Currency, one member designated by the President as 
Governor and one as a Vice Governor. All seven members were appointed by the President for 
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fourteen-year terms. The Board supervised the twelve district banks, as indicated by the chart, 
and was authorized to perform open-market operations (to buy and sell acceptances and 
government securities). Among the most important powers granted to the Board by the Act is the 
power to issue currency without a limit. 
The Federal Advisory Board was composed of twelve members, one from each Federal 
Reserve district. The member for each district was elected annually by the board of directors of 
the Federal Reserve Bank for that district. The Act required the Board to meet at least four times 
a year in Washington D.C. All members of the Board were private commercial bankers. The 
board was empowered to either directly or through its officers make representations regarding 
matters within the jurisdiction of the Federal Reserve Board, to call for information, and to make 
recommendations in regard to discount rates, rediscount business, note issues, reserve conditions 
in various districts, open-market operations, and the general affairs of the Federal Reserve 
System. The Board's function was entirely advisory. 
All member banks with national charters were required to be members of the Federal 
Reserve System. Banks with state charters could voluntarily join the system if they were 
qualified for membership and accepted by the Federal Reserve Board. The financial condition of 
the applying bank, the general character of its management, and whether or not the corporate 
powers exercised were consistent with the purposes of the Federal Reserve Act were all 
important considerations in deciding to allow the applicant's membership. Once the bank 
became a member, it assumed a number of important obligations. It was required to comply with 
the reserve requirements of the Federal Reserve and to keep its required reserves on deposit 
without interest at the Federal Reserve Bank in its district. The member bank was a subject to 
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various requirements of Federal law with respect to branch banking, holding-company regulation, 
interlocking directorates, certain loan and investment limitations, and other matters. Finally, 
each member bank was a subject to supervision and examination by the Federal Reserve 
authorities. 
The Act of 1913, however, was not the end of the banking reform process as many had 
hoped. Changes in the Federal Reserve System were called for after the financial crises of the 
Great Depression and were accomplished primarily by the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 and the 
Banking Act of 1935. These acts extended the powers of the Federal Reserve, particularly those 
of the Federal Reserve Board, and created the system as we know it today. 
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-Summary 
The chaotic nature of American banking prior to and during the civil war led to an 
attempt to form national banks. Such banks presumably could solve some of the most pressing 
problems of that time: highly-risky investments by state banks, variety of notes which made trade 
difficult and expensive, bank monopoly and special favoritism, lack of available and sufficient 
reserves to back up the deposits, state banks issuing more notes than their paid-in capital could 
support, etc. 
Formation of the national banking system in 1864 helped solve some ofthese problems 
but it failed with respect to some others. For instance, the Act of 1864 prohibited banks from 
engaging in some high-risk activities, such as long-term, non-commercial investments and 
operations. It also attempted to solve the problem of bank monopolies and special favoritism by 
embracing the principle of free banking. The Act authorized national banks to issue notes 
secured by the u.s. government which now made notes more sound and, also, made an attempt 
to standardize the reserves held against bank deposits. However, the national banking system did 
not foster interbank cooperation and did not have much influence on the non-national banks. 
Therefore, in time of panic, each bank scrambled to protect itself which made it more difficult to 
resist the increasing runs on banks. Furthermore, pyramiding of reserves caused the actual level 
of available reserves to be much lower than it was nominally required, thus making the banking 
system weaker than it appeared. The inelasticity of currency was one of the more important 
problems of the national banking system. When the economy was performing well, the money 
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supply could not be increased to accommodate its needs nor could it shrink when the economy 
was sluggish. 
The weaknesses of the national banking system in the 1800s were apparent to 
contemporary observers. However, restructuring ofthe system required major changes which 
many did not favor. It was the severe panic of 1907 that induced lawmakers to undertake a major 
reform of the system. The panic, it was claimed, transformed a fairly mild economic contraction 
into a severe one which motivated the monetary reform. In May 1908, Congress passed the 
Aldrich-Vreeland Act, a piece of stopgap legislation designed to prevent panics like those that 
plagued the U.S. economy in previous years. The Aldrich-Vreeland Act created a National 
Currency Association with the power to issue emergency currency to banks experiencing 
difficulty resulting from a general monetary stringency. The Act also created the National 
Monetary Commission charged with conducting a study of the money and banking system. 
The work of the National Monetary Commission led to the first attempt to establish a 
central bank along the lines of the Federal Reserve by introducing the Aldrich bill in 1911. The 
bill would have created a central bank called the National Reserve Association. Membership in 
the Association was voluntary, bank notes were to be issued against general assets and 
government bonds, and there were provisions for central rediscounting of commercial paper, 
reserves against deposits, and reserves against bank note issues. The Aldrich bill vested the 
control over the Association in the nation's bankers rather than in the government. This was 
enough to doom the bill since it threatened to bolster the power of the so-called "money trust," a 
concentration of control of money and credit in the hands of a few Wall Street leaders. Also, the 
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bill was introduced by Republicans in a newly-elected Democratic Congress which made its 
approval more difficult. 
After a long and politically controversial process, the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 was 
introduced in Congress the year following the failure of the Aldrich Bill. The intention was to 
create a central banking system which would avoid either political or private domination of the 
monetary system. The new system was a blend of public and private participation under the 
coordination of a public body, the Federal Reserve Board. The system was designed such that it 
could be independent within the general structure of the government, not necessarily independent 
of the government. It has been compared broadly to a trusteeship created by the Congress to 
administer the nation's credit and monetary policies. It was a trusteeship committed to 
safeguarding the integrity of the monetary system. The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 provided 
tools to manage money and credit markets more effectively than ever before. However, its 
effectiveness was widely questioned during the Great Depression of 1930s when three banking 
panics occurred. Despite the fact that the original Act of 1913 was changed by the Glass-Steagall 
Act of 1933 and Banking Act of 1935, it still remains one of the most important pieces of 
financial legislation enacted in the twentieth century. The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 had 
created the basic structure ofthe Federal Reserve System which still remains and is one of the 
most successful financial entities in the world. In a sense, it is comparable to the Roman 
Colosseum, a ruin still admired by many. 
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Amrrtrill was $!!,OOO,(.(M); IItH·Plu,:5 on book nrt~moon-tbe Knlckcrl)O~ker had been 
Valin's, If'ss current t"xPt'U~Ij~ ant! tax~~ !orccd to clos~ Itll door" atteor a run upon. 
rlaltt, Sl!l . .J:i~ • .JtH: rh'p')slt,; I ~mbJ('r:.t to it h~' many ltuncJr,·l!.:I ot It» cUltomera b.Jld 
chp-("k., not "ref'~rrt'l1. $-4:!,:.!fn.7:11. \ tho ",1thdrawfll oC ~.IJI')).(M)J <"lUll .. It 1. 
Th.) to.t.! r(>'{v)urc('''l or thd ~:1l·mr;C1Y wer(' unUf'r,UI)o.)d that tht'l clollnK toUowf14 the 
Si7.()II:.J."tH, dh·l,lt·u al'l f'ol!owl'I: Uonlls linll payrn .. nt of U.VOU.4JO(} dl!lmo.nd~d by one 
murtgagf>!'I, S:I.-l:}I,KI\,1; M!oc.l.:. nnll bond \lnot.Utullon, 
In\'f'''ltlI<'nlH, ~1::,~311.tol; loU:nf'd on t'I)!Ial. III 1IIplt,., of th,.. AtrenUI1UJI f'rtor." mat'!. 
tog,.thf'r ugain f·rall"'. $ .. ::.:-.::'i,2o~: ot!h'r IO(lIiR. tfld:idillb hy tll., Vlrr,'tou oC thd compu..oy at th. 
t~jl!'l tlmf" the .n· hllH \llln·!iu!'t"'d, 1:-,.lt'::',::IZ!; on'nlrart~.1 ull-nl..:-ht rncetlnc on )[ondtlY 1I1I'ht at 
: Ilr(·',lnvaS:I .. <l v:1th f:':,·:.':;';I: llttt' (rom tru~t {'Q!I.p,ln!,'!'I, II.Lllk". ~.~rry·tI. fulluwlng Prf>I'h1ent Uu.mer'. 
. I Q.tlTl)olnli.f'r~, nut In"~lId,·tl In blllrl dnt" aLrup! rCblgl1atlon u.utJ th", , .. tU!"ltl or the 
1·"1 is !("(!Tn npprn\'(',j n·~"'I'\'I' ·"~PO~ltorl"'. Ii'!!!" I Hnnk; or Commerco longf~r to elf'ar Co~ "I:Jttllt~I:Il~;~.! ~~~;~ I amour:t l.O! ()fl!'lI·~~. ~~.i:I1,7~; d'~I' rrum nll. ttl', K1I1d':crbock .. r. th., mea.'Hlro. tlnAU)" ~. I 'r'l 1 I 1 r I 'troYI'd n·s,"r\'l~ dl'p'J;,.Itork"'~ 1(':iM UJnl)U~t ad{'Dtt'd. JU.-!lIdhlg tho nUt:mpt to l'0l1.4I' l.r~l:I;~tJa un""" 111~:'; :~= uf (If(!'I::~.''I. ~ti,7::4,{J.'Y): sP".'l.t, t::''..!''''''.:!'_~J; 1,,- a. 11ti,II\}I,()U) Kuaruntt·u fUllt!, wer., un.uo.. 
: I ; 1 ~::~k~(:n~~;~.~~:~.t,t-"7.a::~tjlt.~r~1~(:~S~~\:;~t~~:::: cl'~:dul. 
.\.leI to UIlU1.;.., 1 a"'~,-lr(, :Hn:t, 1';7. \\'hftt J. 1-. llor".1l S"I.,. 
If 1 (1:1 thf' f~rt")".l Th .. l\Ol.ll ll,J.Ull1tlt·::I wprr ~"'j,()'(:, 1114. Th" dosing or tho Lunk; whkh Iloma 
al (h,~ Tr,.a,'''~I"Y 1'11\·1,1 .. 1 aM rul 10) \'.' 1'1 , (·t'rttr!r-"t.,~ of dl'rlol'!:t, !)!r,vtor'4 ",:1:1 llU!u·d lip tu 1L lull) hUllr 
I,. rnI'Tlt h;.l\'.-, frtr !lvt pnrf'rr~d, :f;~,,:""'oI.H7: nrnvllllt dutt to lUiil nl",ill WlUI unly t"lIlc;orsl·)-, altbou.h 
trW.:l cornr~nh~8. $1.~,H.1"'1;' afl}('Il1f1t <..IUu 141Jdl hop", Wt'ro ~ntlr .. ly llwndoued IJ)' 
Lank; llrlll banklt-'rK. !k.';.~j:':.tU:!; dtl~, .a.l\1uC:ol utlw/" L)jrel~tllrfl. Jell lu ~'nmpkt~ dt:m· 
\Muktl.' $;.!,OV:,:, 1:':::; Llul!' l"u\tlllKl'I .tl111 hUlIi I orullzatlc)l1 upon thoj. little'" £:.:x't'ban •• , 
as.oda1Ion:-" ,t}.",.:!Co:!; du,t.i 'U~ •• x,"":Jlor, ~ y.ht;'"r~ MlI.yt:'r • L'". ,\Aient. d,,\'I,'1\ a.n4. 
l-:Uar.nlan, admlllll"trIl10r. ~<': .• ' $:,,'''''''.'':st; II.J"ICt:'.'J crumbled. without rrlil.at"I1':~ under 
oUIt!r l l!ub1Jttlt.s. $UtJ.f...II..N_ :1 IlU li,Vlllahl'lut or .wlllng orders, II: SurplU!J liml undh·idt'd JlTf~(jliJ OIl mark,.t Jl~"".ltal~d lhlt' formation or (L blC 
nlur-. 'ot IiIlOClt. Ilud ~JOd~. 'It'~!J ('urrent .llolley P~l by the Jea.(Un& CJf'arlDc Jloua. 
expen";'. and tax('~ )\8.'-1. $ O.:!:!i.:J:::!; 1'!t1!""1 banks. hl:hped out by the Joanl~ or fd. .. 
plus on baals or book val • aft ... r ("hOTb' •. 000.000 or aovf'rnment money. broucht 
Ing aud credHtns acf'rut.' Infprf'U not I StlCf'f!'tary of the TreuurT Cortelyoll bar .. 
f'"lf'rl"d on book •• SlO,:-,o:"l) 1; tlUrplU8 ant! I rl .. t..lly to wI. ~lty. and led at once to 
undlvt4rd prOfit! on mark . valul's, artr:r COnrUff"nl"~8 of KnJekt'r~eker offIcer. and 
f'hargtn. and eredlttnc a ru@'d IPltf'JrNt. I thu h~'adtng banke-A or New York at ).Jor:-
N'<"~h·~ 1h~ $l(),IVJ]~(Jtn: total amOunt· t dfOPOllt. on! gan &: Co.'. ot(lcu, with .llr. )(oraan pre--
~JI,\'e •. He 1 which ~tnt&rf'At .... u; bflln paid on that! IldlnB'. The 801e Alm wa. to devla. JI'ft-t 
or a! 141n& datt., $:iO.Ol2,3flJ. '1 ! m.,d,!a..te ptana Co meet the aituatton tbu.. 
unu.n.Unc or ! ~ - cr~atP.d. ." I ! ENDED HER LIFE IN HE OCEAN Who" ~rr. lforpn len hi. olnee lau 
ot thfo day I I , In the e\'~nlmr at the ~1un ,or Cbht: Itath.,.. 
!":ew York M rI. S~hubert Jumped ~ lerboard from IflK' h~, rn",de tb!JI .t.temoent ,to the ~aJt.. , 
s~~~~r~e;; I I the Steamer M I Itou.' , ! '. tnK' Tf"rx:'rt.n: .,"', 
Controlll"r or BO~TON. Oct. ~-The u.1elde ot ),tu. •• Wf! aTIt doln. every thin&"' we can. .~, 
. Crtltophf'r Rc-bubH't.. who •• on her way rallt &II we caD. but aothln. has "If( 
otnc-f!n Wotrl') Crom' dermany to J"htw.de Phla. trom the; cryatalUud.'" ", 
.J,tu ... lJon tu .tf!a~r' Manjtuu. _ala rf' rhd upun the I AskeO wheth~r an)~t.!ut31dfl .ttorta "'to\ 
outltxl1c. "·a_ 1.1 rl,·.1 'or the ·steamer ht:d. to-db)'. ~lnK made to eonabLo the Knlclcerbotk1 
oC th" The WOOl an. 'IiI,lIo ... a_ln ~:hl&:hly l1ervo" .... Truat Company to rteurne .Mr. ')for • ., 
dQOn, .tate. J~mpe.d cr.·erboard au Oct.. 11. _hllln .. !d,: I " 
rollabe-' the )laJ1. ttou ",",'.I'! one I: from'1«1-1"1 don.'t' knOW' aaT!bln.c abf)ut.t.h~t:{ 
werp. )Jr. 8cbu.bert am not t.a.lJdll6 .. boUt thaL" I , , 
,,,,,,,,,,d1i.teJy took talMr. : . _ . I _~_~ Th_ pr_"t a' tU ... D1'~_t .. 
, I" ,!: j , " .: '~ " ' 
I 
I 
nell .... trouble wbldI pereo-
tM dbotTlct. 
atmo.pJJere ~uN4 & .e'en-
tandlnl' wh4m th6 fallt"., or 
... announaed whleh. bad 1t 11:1, ("OrT't'let.ed. mt.ht ha\'., 
alit mom.nU of tradl"&, an 
;;:eT~~~~~O~~~·~~:~· 
~J.n~ ronrum the 8u.potn· 
&. Co" tbe C1"01I'''. on the 
y bAr~III" on hi. word., 
~m'" Mt of on. of thft 
In ~d. holJll(t. tn tbe 
~ ~~~ ':~lrti r~~:~ f!~~~; 
I anxlou" In'lulr1u true 
Irmath:m of [he ne~'.. 1t 
"m~nt for th6 trllhtf'nf"t1 
~~~~I':n~l.r b~tlf'rI~~e~t~!'~1 1~ ; p:'nl~'" _~,~&"<l"l.l.~mj 
111 h.JnK be rt"mcmhf!lf"d. 
I •• u~ •• ~t.tif'mrnt. 
th., Knickerbocku Tnllllt 
1I nc('d th'" 1f'mpdt'LI ry 1'lt1~·1 
t~~~~r r~!lrn~lt~tt~~I:n8~t:~; 
t'l con .. hh:r Ill .... erlou81 
O('l"urr~ tJ tn the afCillr" or 
:·~:~~·k. ~~:. ftO'~}':~;~?'e:i~~; I mf"~1 
J;:'~t1lrlg the U:r"dor~ to· 1.'r\1. 
'/ d!rt not COIl\ l'flO Hl1t:1 -4 !!N' 
'·("fll.1-!' ~'all In .""Slon Ulitlil 
III the p\"f>!1lul'. ,,\j·t In~ 
r1f~i-"t 01 UUJ.kh.g O(our~c 
c.lll~d Into the l1h"'ctor~' 
1:lhlrm ..... ' r"CltrdlUI: I~'! I r.'''·'·, .. · .. ,(." 
e (,'I)mpuny bt'Jng "t·l4> to I 
r. A tohflrt tlmp! afLer th.~ 
I .. !It<ttNnt'ut Woa. ISIl\ll'd b)' 
,un tho t:lULte l;xumlm,'rll' 
,.1IJW~: 
.. bout , o·rlork. '1&"lnc r ... • I 
;U~;IUj~~~':a~~'~ htIJ~o!~:.r~~! 
)' OfOn(O""I, trill"", him that J 
W"J~ Itot hnl'~·I"II". th .. y ""'''M~ 
• ('n<tltll1n that I thou"ht h .. 
,~ ~O(m~I~I\ln~~~~ ~:~I~~. h1~' o\·~'r. 
,n."rt'hf'nflh e a .~t .. m ... nt 1Iii~ On h!~ 
.the uh"uhon". J tafl\'~ ab,) f'rborkt'r 
'f"n:,'nt nUIII .. to him 'ro," til,", g3lht"rtd 
., tlt.llie lJanklDI I.H""nm",ur fr.ont thl('! 
110 one t 
ll"r Trll"t rompanr I. not 1 lind)", 
LI It Ilia)' .1111 rt-'(' .. I,"e .. rt .. • 
rln"OI'!ltl (nilltutk.nl. It II I 
II. d'.OJII nl 1111\0:.1.1 • ., it doe. 
:~~lltIR~f.I(~t~d~~ g~: ~~,~~I.I:I'S1 ~ho 
rul. '" 1:0 hi I,,:ad~ to)' la ..... th~ I 
',u Ha.nklnll' d'·I.artAllf'fH. • , 
t rt'n:ale,j flffl<i.1.lty how 
,JlLlun or th., "l'I/Wlt ('um61 
~:~~.ltl!:p~rl~I'W~(i~I.:~I~!~~.~·; 
lu,!!u.: uank~n,l who look I 
,1\ ;\{ouday III~hJ.'1R ~rrll!·t!l 
l~tUlltll)n, to ~h"'" ,,(tt'ct 
jn~;~V~I~;~:" t;~utd~JI::l;:·r~~.~ ~nnmn"".'." 
In'·.~ h~'~~l1r~d~;'~ ~'~i~ f 
wo (lilt' c!"ollr:«, u:oIk 
CUI I\: nlc''k.'rhockl·!". 
'torR OJ tht'! cornpu!!,· tktld 
'f"!nt III," rUllu.a~I·mf·n[ or 
,uld In "'\'f"ry W.I)' fUfthl'!f ,,,,,,,,·,,,,,n, 
'l~(.n whkh would I1vlJut-
h .. ~t Int "H'~t!l ct {I.'plt:"'!-
ult1 .. r~ bilk .... pro\hl.·.1 the 
\\.," nht ah\{· 10 (IPt'":~ to-
J .. lJ!r.·~·tor a.dmltt~d th(;'r'¢ 
fI() 1,.11"', 
-rtnrl"l ~1t1tl that "",;h\lf'J tht> 
il!'.f"lr mtf~ht IIPvJr IlJr a 
Ill! :.III llHllndu:tl dl'po~ltnr 
.. n 10 Ihl~ fond. tho trust 
f·n :\11"\"":11 tll:J[ [til actIon, 
l~elu'rlil \\'ouM f<up"rl4t.'d,! 
lnlon., .,ntl that tlw .. ~ror'! 
\jH QPpolntment or a re- I Kr,lrI,irbj",li,,. 
~ thf!! IIwn:q, .. mf!fll of tlL·' i ~~'~},~ ~~~~;'~I:t'd, wOlild Le j 
nlullt .'\ hnl1t1olt~r1. I 
,a that Surf. Skinul'r W.UI; 
~r~:ttlhl}~~ ;~I!t':i,~::" wl:~i~h j 
• trUf!;t l'.lmpany·~ offkf'!o!. I 
Y. authOrized thts etate·1 
;:~·t:··I~~~~h:O~:t~O:;I~::; ; 
I!sourt"~. ot lhr e.unl .. ny. bu't 
f'11I10I")fj tbat no fruit conlptln,. 
101 .... "'t •• t all I"uell to rn.teC 
tiP .. ~l~r rwrt 01' It_ d,.~- , ~i:;: A'!.~1n:O~~I~rt~t:;d~nnt l~t I 
!lay 'hat 1tw- ...... (Ulf(· •• of thl!t II N'E\V 
Ira than .urUel.nt to .pay aU ' 
, In th~ Dlr'ecton- etatc6 (joolJ~ 
lemel1t I.IlMUNl hv Rupt_I' 
.... \ttl. un cArHer "tntemt"nt 
'h thl' SUJlCrtntE-ndt'nt j~_ A 
Dlrpctor,,' meeting. In Bu'era' 
I~:~~~ro~ )~t t~~d t;~~t c~~~ 1 t~rdam 
hilt It.,w •• (:ntlrf'ly '-01\,.1 
thut he fe-It lure thf'l lru"t 
I go un tne~tlrur ·the d ... • 
it It '\\,I&ro 811¢(,f'",fifUI In; 
10llnl ("nl'lh, In the I'('eon,] i 
tomll~~y"h~.f:':~~f.dr:O~:I~~~ I 
;,erlntendent Ucll-(.'ribed as' 
. " ~ to I 
l'I or th .... Knlel{frllo~krr i 
l\' hHII\'I~\Utlly. tt waM (11\)', uKTt'f'll ut !\Ioruia)' :t I 
: tu GIl:Jruntee borruwlllKl'l 111 .. ,n 
'II) [la II)' on lUI a.~l't~ trUlII I .. ! 
111(111&. Thf'~~ '1Iltllv!tJual:" 
, ;Ui~ aM ~~tOtl.I"JjJ nlll> :t 
·In.:· ,,"UalantN' • t1lat b'J 
lilA r utlll'1' Illrl'f·hJrK 
I;lra frulII ~101I,tl") to 
It.., 1110 , .. ' 1:,;\I:t1"nll~I'I·tt, hll,,-. 
l'OllllIUlI'- ruund: It 10Ipo.'o(-· 
h,! I'ash It u,·t,th'lI. 0111' nr : 
10 waM t'allf'd Into :'I.tundav: •• 
~\t·(· !tald ~'f'~t~rd"'~ t lIa t th'p , h~ 
1~:~"·~~\·$~.(~~).(~t~~:'~I?\'~\~'~.i.~ ! h~. '("'r~ 1IOt're notll~L"C'rlt .. d.(or I .. 
,l· •• ~~:;r .. :'":;~{\tlll~~'t~;~!!~.fkl .. nt I 
l \h\:j, rl·lilth.-\y :-oma11 lI'\lm 
\'<1:04 made :\vnlla'lJlc 10 th~' TI~~~to~~~,m~~.!\r ~~:~,.~;:~.~.~. , ~;;;;;n';~;;;;'~~;~ 
'lock to tile fma.ncial <:UII;~! 
; !iO~'D". _"Cr-r 1~3nL': Clou' •• 
ho~,r aflf't" tlw u~or~ ,,'1'1"('0 c1o~ed 
111~H cJ .. pm:ltors 1~t'Ilt thdt rO'tOl· 
t ha t t h(~ l'ul .. l1 would ('omCl, .. \ l" 
nt tile- IloC'l("ll door~ of I Tru!'t 
{(I'r 1!1/'\\'!'l.! o.nd (L t00 I· 
. for l;l,sllioll Ih tront i :~Hlon, 
from th,' Hankhl~ DI},1 _ompa 
lNH'n It it hllil h(·a~lnG' on 1 for 
I, H(>rL)r.~:: (I'clock w(\rd 1 BII !1I~, 
aloll;: the rt"mlllllltl~ lin ... that ~ York 
! (It l'~:'''Il1(>nt mll'lt Lt~ ~t'rt'rrt"ll' t~~n~l mllrIl1:1~. 'Bllt man .... of iUI('I d ..... 1 t co 
: p('r!o! .... \:t·~·l'J 11IIlll tile ("~OS!) ~l! i ~l~~ the 
'1~" s:;~~eare 
er own·nos 
B~t ll~vin 
161,5:20 i nose 
, 'by exp~ri'enc 
t will b'est f 
t~ !>ol\'('nt." arMed • 
red 10 hi .. ortlt·f". 
(·Ioti"''' th.-It" ",'Indo' 
1111;,1,11~t:. 1I~}llh~~lit!n 
rtfflctul .. wlth 1l'lfOr 
th('y ,,'ere i't'I1t to • 
tn(i.!< .l,h(>~r h.lH·t;, watt i_\'lI~nt:i or , hnnk!'! wh·, hall ,1·l'("I!'. 
fl)r IIIl' mo.!St·p~lIt. btll :\:-1. with tho.",'""'''.'''''''' r 'i'rll:ot L·Cllllp~ll 
(III .fnHl~ r.11I1\\,t'u tht'lf to ("ol~r{'t ttli'm B,r"" 
man whu bud lJ""1I flnlOn;,: I(ltl~. 1 )(""!"lIl' till' r •. 
IlIH. \·Uttlpi.t1lllng- IIttt{'rl}, ut '''1 \"~re rlOl 1111'1. !\Ir. 'I'll' 
l':<O1'l ,)r" Lho~I' alll_'..\,d or 11::1\ U)llIlt- rl.v ~j,!lfl",'." !Iud t .. 
. IHIIIH'Y ... ]-;\"'1 y hal! hO;lr," hl~ 1l~("~ ullrlt,t,; tll~ (;.("1 
('(\;;~I~i~ :~~ ~;~~~! ~(~l:~:;~~~~ 11 l~~~:~ , 
finN..!. !~,r (-';\..:1\ haIr hO\l1";o; d~~.1 '1 h~,.o 
I' , I I I TIIN"fI W~'J'f'I othl·r l·('npl~ {'nnrl"""lJt ~~~t \\~::IIi.:r tl;:~,~~t'"~\"o;;~,1 ~~\:n~,,!t~ I tl"'(>IIJ::;' th('J'iCoPlran~' ~:lrdr lhrn-u~h : 
wlH'l1.. Il)l'~' J.:o)llt. :\1 LIn.\' iI~IO,.·d Irll:lhl(:l~. ~{'a"ly ~.·,iI('r,(I((1 WI1"' Uf'v"",tt 
wl'n' J,;ng;.rlll~ to lot.' pl.!k,·d ,lljI b~roro Ihe lvrrh'all' W,",l'l!I InstrUl'tt',\ fr,) 
IIlurk(-'I. OUten·, ~a\"ol'.'d I.'n.".· downtown Ill', (\1·(·lIn8 IlIrthfOr dt>TIt'''\ liou~t. a I 11'~al t~r Tyro 'hlrgftJ l(lt"posllorf', orl'to J(,r ,n willi.' 
I~S J1~nd ou~ and the- 01 ,. (Or $illl).nO,). made llQ <otto 
K.,Io',<prhn"'k,"'. ," ,to wl'thdr'u. lth~lr money. 
1 I.:J... n",. )tale I-:ntorr .. d. 
r "'h~n U li'lUNtlY ot mon,), ib~bnn 
'l~~~I;:,~:~,~'~I~~;:'~;~:~:~.;·; ~~j lor. dwlnt.1Je u Jer tho heil\,'Y Cillis ot II hi I man. I larger dep tor!t til" ottlclals "'~Irlpd 
ooInh""n".d k'riol!.n~or'jll"!'tht:l':: talcu ad\'8 ~I\ ot tht"lr l"lausQ, rel'lulrtr 
.. hQ Hlild, .. 111 th"" .;!a.)'II.r ~df'8Ir"d' lor the pa~'m~nt • 
am I;rtUg to c~rtlrjCfttf', r dep(l81t.. Aho\1t: hair tl ILrn~nR" tho~.., bll'tn~l'''! I done by hu·ee Cf!rtltko.tt, 
l,;k •.• t,nelk.,. Io.bh~' t": thpy gll'ln , lIttle add:r:d Interest to tI 
R" It whole I deDOsltorf!. ,u'hls CI,t orr a', Jlflrt or 11 
O~i~~~~ HI~~::; 1 ~rag on th tush eupply. but not f~r lou, 
. In tOlle, but bltt •• r wonhl \ rhe ('('rUn i.\& holdt'JT8 ga"\"A wuy to oil 
speculation and promo-, f'r~ v.-Ill) ,J 011~n l\('COtltr,i!I" 1\0(,1 tI pr~l.I5:ul'e n n,t the Imnwdl to rt;"l!tlur.', 
1 .. WO:'l rewm I\: Until tha lel("11 (~n. ml"!HS1l1-! FIFTH AVENUE BR NCH from lid H dwny came tn tructlng tl, 
I ____ I . II .. l:~~';!~I~~l::ll~ 1J)~~~.~n~I~'~'~ 1~~~r~:~I~it c10WT 
ion Paid Out There-nJr' town." An ~J :Mr, ·rurnhull ... It UlPHI' , I th.Bt we hu. 1tho aRI'~(". hut thnt ... ·t· (':111 Stan&.! by Danlc. rt·all7:'1 Oil hem JllllIt IIU ..... to'I'a)- orr u l 
1f . lIahlltt!r:ot:' " 
:.rn~\: ,~:~tlC';~~r;~;I'~~p~~I:~~,~ I rn'~r~;'~h11? ;~~~'\fI b~~k~:~tUIllt't! In tl 
par!',:'!! prlm-Iral bran'ch at I .: [can't t\II," ho !I·pll.·lf. Th,,." ... f •• ,,. l:'Stt'(,f't nnd l:,rth A\"~nuell'1;'~~~1 °u~t(' :·~W~~~lt~r~I1~:lt·hl~ll\l!1;~~nEI. \\~,~:: 
yt"H('ri.hty nftern('lon, Yf."*,' (lllt'ntly (If fllo-"f] (0 prrmit rile ,.xlt \ 
I 'l'urnhull. whn "":1K tn I eatroJ)!4 wi bad rt·tlIuill~u Jn~IJt! allu ha 
0(- the utrnlt'll (lr th., (2010-1 ('en ,1<.1..1111 O.~J_._u_n_. __ _ 
'"~'ld' to lho, ropOrloro In I 1:-1 ,tlA ~M A:'>IO ~11E n,rw.'ix. 
JX',"<.on In t\ hl~h P1L.1'I In Nearlv S GOO 000 Drawn: Out 0 
,wh f ) UI)(':04I1't knnWI Wll:lt/ K·· • k' . 
nll who ha!t done hl~ l.('~t 10 "Ie boc eor Dranches There'. 
h~g'.Hl mOflth!i a~u tn I mnlt.! ,,\nxlotJ!LI" P9l'1ltoM' hf'gan to arrt"t" rlt 11: 
'It. The ~lIowhftll :-:d'ms lL l1(lor,,, or til llarlMn Hr:anC'h of clio Knkk 
It Is'.t"nrt£"rl. J.n~t nl,.;ht· Ht)(}('k<'r. o~ thp SOUUhVl'sf ('nrflfr ur 1::;., 
nu,' !'f~ht. ILn.1 ha.l lL ... ~d~ far HlrN·t ~llll' ('9,'OX An'nup, bt'f,tlr<", 8 u'('!<w}.. 
Our ltnh!lttlt"~~. ".(. cou~l not Tty th,. till ~he ottlc.~r~_o(' till' hunk III 
To.dny "W(o lmld nud Jl1or~ rl\'('~l full~' :.::\ pt'r!,ons "\'Io"('r", ('llJstf'rcll II' 
U,(lt)(),IIfoI) !n two tlml n hrtJ1' hounJ~ I thn sltlpwa c" In front or th,~ "Iwk. 1'h 
" , •• ,. j IlI:tJ0rlty" ('rf' \'.'("111111"11. \Vh.'n ,,'. ].' ,. 
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Dr 
,,.-., ..... '-
Ju 
Cig, 
Chri~ 
presentation of a box 0 
ported from Porto Rico) reflects 
the ' giver. It is a brand of unique, 
to discriminating smokers who bu~ 
Here are the popular sizes'-c--
the size regulating- the price. ' 
IMPORTED FROM PO, 
Coqueta Size 
Panetela Size 
Saratoga Size 
Pacifico Size 
B ... I~ 
$2.50 
3.00 
3.33 
3.00 
Co 
B ... r 
Perfeccionado Size $1.91 
E:.:ceptionalle Size 2.S 
Knickerbocker Size 2.S 
Billnarck Size 3.0 
-/. H:'\~'K. LAUJI~ 
:. FI t. ~! .. nr. l((A,; 
". ~ :'1 ·r.j I',.,. II" 
J'HE BROI\X 
'.AI'!, ,\,II,lt "htul/P • ('1') 
I "'1001-: J.~ ~f .. Hr, .... .A_lit 
. . r.b ... ·' /,.1, . ,. rl, .. ".; 
l'Y[-' IN I'Af\:AMA i • 
!';~'~,,- York-;'rheai;e;' 
'101,1 11. 1 1' .. ltalJrl;t.,. 
, ].,.01" f.\I:I,., •• t., .. f'r, 
"1 \1'.1, ,·,11" .... "( •. "II ... " . 
..... , •• : A. h.'I\j;~:'-Jc~,;,;j' i' 
II ~ 11 , .. , AI I". ,·t.rk 4.:; 
t· \., U. '.1"'11, ''''''\11. f,'I ... " 
, .... ~.-·t·.;-'""I·t-;-::-l~M.; 
;":'~~; 'Yl~"~; :!.~'~~4~t,~:; 
,n""t WllfI.",., )1"rrl ...... 
. h. '·h ... '.~.I ... ""lu 0"11,. 
,I ~'. :'~'L"I~~'I~~~" t ~I·'''f;. "'1"': 
I ('LA"tl': ·~-I~p.-1I,\.·-III.Tf.~" ! JtJTf'III'~ 11 .. ',.).0 '''rl. "Ti,,' \\'111'1 ... "I" 
" I'. ,'Ia:"" ""!h \\'(1) l'r.J. 
I, .. ~. It"L,'. L 11.111"." e() ,(," 
1', 'h,'1, Ioh'\ nalf-IIII.)', :J, 
.". " .... ~) P"'I .. ,IIIII ur "Il<:~' 
'L; I. .1,,1 I,~"'lq ftl. Jr. 
i uln"~It:~ut V~t~t,,'.~.':I' u 
11. BIG ACTS 
II' 'fullfil'" .1",., ..... 
I'f~l UVA TfON'-N [)W. 
flU OU - :'i ,~:::-
": r~l I'I'I~ 1 ,\~.f 
,i\(' Sbve TI'aiTic 
,. 11' ,\,., I ~ "dfl,P!.\!. 
.'. '. ;",", \:'''1<'1\\1:)'. 
, '. ;: '.11 I ;t1 ~J. .\ .' ;~ 
\\ II J I'," 
.,',1 '.Il :. ,\ i/ ',')' 
I "I.'Y. 2'i ,,,< jO C\5. 
I rl .... ! ..• I" l: 
l" "~I"'r (h~u \'OIH',,:,: 
\',1';',.,· . ,. XIII.! 
1 '~'.,' .\. ~,,' 'lId'1 
ClJI'130Al{D 
"0(1. I HAY." 
- ------. - --------
NATIONALBANKRUSH i SANTA 
r 
DIES ON XMAs TRIP. 
• Struggle Through Snow to Poor 
TO JOIN NEW' SYSTEM :1· Boy.' Home Fatal to Mr. Heap. rJr~="vl:H_ D~e. Z~,-Litlle ~rlppl~<1 \\,:\. 
; hur TrnrrlJo!, S }'p:Jrl-J ohl, hi to have a. 
- ",,-rr), r.hrlalma~, I,ut his Santa Claus 111 
Applications from 213 Received 11~ad. It \\'a~ W. 11. Heap. lJ. phllan-
Up to 5 P. M., and Tele- Ihmpl,t. Who cume to Denwr trom rat· 
. "rM(m, N. J., hN'auHc strieken with tu~r-gramS Still Pouring In. 
'·ulOMIH. Whf) madl~ pOH:'\\blc the Aal\,Ol.-
U'-,11 (,r the c·hri"trnas lnyth tlJT ,,,·,lbul . 
SCORES OF TRUS1 
ARE SEEKING PE 
Belief That American Sug[ 
Others Will Compromise 
Department of Justic 
18 OTHER CONCERNS APPLY )Ir, Heap'" (1<:ath e"'n~ ye.te,<Iay \)""au~o COVERNMENT IS HOF-: lw tr.nor~d hl~ dfWtt')T'8 orth'r to Tf'matll )' 
------- tin b- d and wnlk.~d l-if"\,f'ral blo('kH throu;:;h .,.. _____ _ 
(j~·'·ll fH1/JW In th~ in'Jlovf.'rl~h('d R£'Ctioli l ." . 
MOil Banke Here Await Action of I ',f Ih~ dly. II<- "urrh'd a HIed. lJ. trnln or Wilson'. Speech an IntlmatIC 
Their Siockhoidera-Work Begun ("Y '·are. ~1"t1 ••. ". ruhhers. ('anely, Rnd He Is Willing to Meet [ 
Juan;.' otht'r prl~H~ntfl for the d~stttutc) 
on Plans for Organization. Harri. family. Business Half Way. 
~lr. U.'f\JJ Jt:arnrcl tll:.I.t :\fr~. ITnr1"i~. in 
df'!'Ipf'r:1t1oll, ha.d tolll hf:r little boy lhlt.t 
FJI-Il'j"lr II, 1'lIr Stll) 1'(;)"]; 'fi'flll!. ttlf·rr. wus no f.1RJltIL Clau$ ror poor chll- ilJllI'i/ll to 'f}lr XI'IC Yorl; 'Ti 
""A:{llt:-"'I;·r()~. )1,.(,. ~·1.-Ht'rr~tnr:.' I 1]1"1'11. Ho ro!"w frOJll hl.:q hNl nnd In hll1 'VASJll:-;nTOX. Dec. :!4.-It I 
)f,.,\doo und nlhf·r rdflo'bdH of 1hl! ~'\d.~ I fllllon}(Jbllo (lro"fj t(J the Hhopptng c11~~.1 pectation In offklal t"lrclf'9 t1. 
fr.lnl~tr3tll n ,I:" .gr<lflflr-d 'It, tilr: l'I~"1 'rkt. wh('I'u IH~ hllns(>1t nlao', the :.;.c-lu~-I Attorn~.v Gcn{'ral ~l.~Ih'.rn~)ld~ T 
'f,l)n1fJ (ro:,) IlII' (rlIJrltn' t., till" t·na t 1- ! qhl1 o.t g"lrtt-l (nr the fSllllily. Th ... r.tut()mo~ I '\~ashlngtr," T1('xt 'wl'f'k lie wlI 
f!"jtTlt or f;I,· '11'\\' "' ... ·d'·I·;t! l:I'I"H:I'\'I: H;'l.llt- : hllt~ ('fluId not 1)1>II(.trnto th('o cll"'('fp drlft:-i I '·;fo!.lts frofU Orn("f'I'H and attOl'W 
Ira; !a·",·. "rl~!.":J'!"'" (,r \'ollg-rafulall('11 ~ Ill' t-mll'.\' In till: lowl'-r pllrt of tl")Wl). !-i0 ~ In,lu!-Itrlul cnrnhlll:ltlflns who~'" 
frrm I)~f,kji"ij{ 1111'l1 f nt.llln!-': ,~_ ul_~~~!.!~ :'Ill'. lfulP, !o<;lHK:~~rlllg' ulld~'r 111M hurufln, 1111H.8Indlf',llN] thai tlH'Y .alT' no~ V-~~~~_~·I'r,.tlll·r. \\':lll,~u 10 tlw lhU'1"fR doni'. tWI} hlo('l{H to rll!-!t~\JH!i willl ),11'. :-o.rcHeynold; 
W-.:\J,J(}·ti IIr:·I_(~':._!~~._~';0._~l~~~~ .. _~.!~!"~~~~'!!' ~ awu)'. L(~a\'luC' tho klftH with the rlloth- pOMal~ hp hn,~ In JT1lnd tlll' ~I 
• J!t<':Jdr l""~~.!!.~ __ ~!~~~~I_~~':'I!..l_l~_...!!~f).!--'-"" (-r, Ih' hfthl: IZlltlon or their hH~ln('8a affair. 
N'.irl(~nt!;·~.ll:I~~_i:~ _ IJl;~~~~. ~~~Pllf'~\1\('l1 •• '"the !-IINl will un tllf~ hoy lotH of ;:::,ood. :lbandontnent ot C'onten1plutNJ 
toll'·I'IHI\('·hl.r.'IT,I·I~(Jr'II'~ll"'V; RVRflnr. T thlnlc ir 1I'a t t f t t1 ment l,rotlE"r.utlon of thr:;c OT"g: 
1-, r" ~1·-fl;'·I~~~-"flIh--:rft,,""~nmT;-:Lt. e c n g"4' ou n () l~ OI)(>n, R. (.'ornhln"tl~n' In l'.'stralnt 
-I' CI. l\ltll pIt'Tlt)' of '\vann f~lotllf's h,~ lnay \)~ .. Q ... 
0;; !w: II 1I11 11T' t,·11"I;rJlJdd r . ::.~'I'lk:JtI,r)nH "'Jrf'{j T':ll'tially of 1I1!i nllrr:rnt. (:011'8 and C'mnrnel'ce. 
.. "rIJ ".1111 1,dll;.~ 11·/·.·1\"'''. _,,1 ln~tl·l1- 01"'1) hll' 1:'-1 til<' \t('!-lt Il1t'I;: we h:l\'O Il',~'. In "l)tII.('~liuJI 'with t1u: HIT 
t:n:lJ- n.\tilllt{·d hanl'.:.· . ~'al" kITlio,. hll \' .. '1\'1\\'." • for till' volllntar>' dlx.'iI)IUll"1 
\fIj:~ 1",,11:'" iI:loI 1) ll~ I ,"'dlliiald,·!-' rr l '/lI '\ I 1 tf·I('pItOlJ,.-tl'll'I~I·HI,h I1lf"·~~f'l'. it 
11'\'-'11'\""\' dill, fllll Sli,t'·; 11:111 :l:'~ ." II '.'Ilt ('11\n.ddli~· t·,;,{·11 :;('\zl,d th~ t)htl- ("'/IIllf' kllf,wn that I'VI'l' ~In.' 
I.r .. - I 11 .IfJlt J11\·IIHllt"n'J)!~:fwt.()"·:J::II:ttrrarrk·dt(jh:s 
r:I/ .. j fr,r lIlt III I,·) .... I I', .llJt II "'.: -, IllotHr f':ll' hy .\'r~ lI'I"'ri~ II,. '\':,:-i I,UI"- :,!lJllt'd ofrk,~ tIH.' .!' ... ttfJrllt'Y lit 
lr;:" I,! !-- ,!p.,'rliolrlg t .. tl~ •. "!"")e 11',\:'~f' 'l'l,.,j hUlw' :.1 lid • ~lH~;:;;tli~~:-.; '\'('I'lI "'UI!.:- 111'('11 ('(Iflf"rrlrll{ "Ith n'lH't'Sf'1I 
11:nk ..... ,.1'1,,1.<\ ~'r"111 ,,1:11:10: .~'I .111-:IHnlfNJ, lliit It W:1:-> h,\) I.llt' Jlu"'\\,l:il~('-(,Ulled tl'UHf:i 111 1 Pg-oJl I': 
'(~!11.4 ;'1:,1 II!IIII ,tildl(': .. ta ',II 1")",1,01, ! {it':"I. . •. tioI1S f.·nnl iJiJn tilat nil \' ""'~ 
Ttl,:'1 I!.d\f)t,:d LllIlk·; tl,;I1. ~l/'\JII("L I __ • I IlrU.!it~('utton thl'Oll~1I C'llntonul 
for rOf 'f i!.,·' 11' llo.ld_ ,t '1'llIlJlIlI II \.J 1111:11 I f.,'1/(' "11 ,} 'f'he .\ ell' l\JJJ.; "I !l/lc..... Ild .. :.:i as to Tt'org-alllzation or r! 
lllil ilUr!"Ils. ·,f ~1"'1 .• 1.,0,.1:. 11 II,·tl h tilt' I 1'.\ l'LItsnx :-.; J I) ." -\V II 'rhC~f~ (''XChltl1g"C!i fornJf'd the 11,:1II1101l~\··1 Ill" lr"t: ,11Ih P• ,lr. V.1i:)~H' ~1(:i.L1'1I bi('~~']l7}r'h'd fJo~l.slntt'1JH.nt~ rnn(h~ hy 1'1'~:Jhll~ 
:'Ioutlullul BttJlu" Altl·l)l .. ~. 'I ]j",n·l·r. waH :.!n )o'I'U'!) old. Btlll 'w\~lH a. to \Vhlh' ]IU\lHP \"1~dtorH lu:-;t -:-
!'a!l(,tlflt l'u\'t:,11 "on IJf ,,'lllla!n II. Jle:Jp, a. w('altlty thp. (>tr~t thnt thprf\ wa!i an 
JlJllIkt· Uhl~~~;:~~).\::;;;1 ; lJ()Ir1.~r (I: rf';J! (.~tntI"J in Pflter~on, Jtvin~ through In(Julrl('-s mad" Itt tIl ~~~~I~;IIl-l •••. 1 :o.1::.,~.I\O ut b .• ~ hU!it Twcnty-elg-hth Htrf.f~t, He nlp.nt or JUAtiCC thnt nll\n)- ( 
j·"UffJrnta. ..: .... ::: .. : ~:'. ;~ ~·!.!'2:~):;;! 'Ml1ffcr(,f) (rotn tulJcrclilnsls. antl. ahout ('or)lOru.tions Wf'rl~ llnxlou~ t( ~l:Z~:·~ ::., ...... I·;';'~:O\I(I. lhr('e .\'t'ar~ c1g"fI \,,'l'nt to l)f'tlver In thl"J to tho wlMhe~ and \'ll'wH or th fllnrlrt 0" l\,'II:ldll",... :.lIH.tlOtt IIOPt~ of rl'~alllln~ hlR h<"Hlth. Ills fatlu_.r' ment. 
,~:~~" .. ,'::: .... :........ . .. 1:: :~\.:::,~:~.::~~; IIt:-ft ~(J joIn hll(\ UII l,,",:nlug that he 'fcl1tat!\'tJ ("~\·",.ture~ to lllt: r 
tMlltUl ...... , .... ".. .J 1.IIIO,IIIM : ,,'Us tallillJ.; rnl)I<.lly. l.lla ~rrl\'cd tuo lah... of JUlitk(1 frllll1 rt.pl·t..~t'lHath 
J~wa ..•......... ,....... _ ~·I~;I; .. I~::::! i "'II(~ yt)ufl~ 1I1ll1l'~ \\'1((' ~mr"l\'c:ct 11htl. Anwrienn Rugal' H('flllirll; Con 
~~~~k~··::~:::::::::::::~: :. '7~::~hl): :\11'. Ift·a)). Jr'., wa!1 Wt·1l kWJwrl tor hl~ glv~lJ ground (or hor1f! on thp. 
~.~II~.l'~~L .. :::.:::::::: :,::::: ~ .(,~~!' •. lIflfI I InlJ.ny :l<:ts or kIrHlnl_'ss and eharlty WILLIe rlel.ds that thi:i :.:r_'a t comtdl 
llcrylan(l .... , ...... _ .• , ... 1-4 !:!,~;;:~:~)(::!~~ ~I"ltlh JI) Patel'MoTl. :;:Oon (olluw In tht! ro6t~tt-J)6 or 
)faaarllUJldt:J ............... ;; li,ir.o.(i(lf) -----------__ if..'n.n prel{'phone and TI:"It"!"grnrJil 
~:~~~~~~" .:::::::::::::::::: i 1.1;~:_:::~~ McADOO ACTING PRESIDENT. In offering 10 NIter an nrr.mb' 
:.I' , I I 1 ~lIi.(j(l" ______ th" Attorney U"n{'ml whloh ,"':'.:~.'i" .::::::::::::::::::" HI.~':::_;;::': How Other Cabinet Off! Are ubout a r,'orgallizatioll 0, " ~:~r~~;::,p~~;I'r~'::::::::::::: '~"~I'nl:d' -I' cers Hll'lIt or lt~ a.ffulrs that ....... 'Ii ~.',y,' Y"rk ..... .......... :':.'1;;11:00,) I Spending the Holidays. oltjl,etinfJ nf ~\"'. i\feHI'Yllol.Js , ~;.:.' ~iJ,";~".:· .... " ... "...... l,~~~,:~~:l \v ... \~llr~(~'J'"x, T)t",. :!,J.--S"('r(~tal"Y e%lt olun:lnlstrutJoll and IIlt~;! .... , 
""tlh !';,r,d<t ,l 1. ;::II.II\"II1! ~(('Adlllj wIll h,' .'\"Illl~~ PJ·t!~!dl.tlt o( till: 110\\'('\'''1', thl'H" lI\"t'r!lIl't'S 
;~,':;·oth .. ll.':""'\ ::::::: ..... __ ". !~~.~:::: t'lIlt,-r] !-'I:~I' .... !'l,-lllllrrOW. JII th~' .tl>- f··.'(·~If·tI lh,) :-lt~I:~t~ tJf H till', ,'1 
j':tlr.rl"rnu. '''''::::!IIII,q .!",I·IU·" of J):'P!-'jl!l:lI! \\'jlHUIi alit! \'l('~ p!:t's- of '''''illing-n('!-ls IIll tllt: part of 
~;;,~'~~jt~1.I;I":::::.::::~.. :.:\~:~.::~;: ifl.':rrt _\J:,I·::;I".II ll~~ lJvt.·~)Ilh'.s th~.! ralll(lIn; C'(JtntulhY to cOllfol'tn to UII 
~"1l1'"l 1':II,,!II!;l . ....... '-;::.'. 11'10 ! fJtllC'!:11 ),.'tt II. \\·:t:-sllinhton tOI' Chl'l~t- General'R viE'w!;. l:ut tlte IHt)! 
"~\iUI ..... ........ ••••••• ••••. 1i.4 1I j.r,oIO! '''a:j l.lar. r;ald(!d aH t:ncoul"uglll;.{, anti ~",r."'!t.(ofl .................. I.. ::.11T.il"ql"1 ,. 
"llIh ...................... -; ::.'~"';'.hr!1I1! ~p(.·,t. ('~l C'lnrl(. aft~'r havilll: Chri."it- t8.n~ihlc nlny r(!sult when .\1 
'v.'~.h!t'.~II'1I •.......... , .... :~. ~:.~~ll'i~.1 lllaH rlhlrlt.:r with hi!i famll)!, will It'H.\.c noius I'cturns to "·a~hJflgtvn. 
l\'r.t'QTt)o,!n ................... - •. m.! (or :t IN:tlll'f..! tour III Nr.w Ell ~h d "·tthtn the past few daYtJ tl"\,~1i jruHt COlll!lf.lnl,..<4. of 'I,,'l'd('h lhl'f'''i Which will conth U III;'" g ~ n , 1J h U~ III 'r",:<l:-l. orJ(." III 'r"'TlIlf't-I8e~, (.,)llP ~n aMsurnbl-" 0" Ju.' ~1r) un..:.. ~.,OtngreHa re.. een runl0ra t nt coq)orath 
VI' . - . . n .~ • ~'. -. "e~re ftr~- }Jr)'un have been BUed-I')' tho Go\,,,,. irKlnUI, OIH' I~\ :\rHrYh~nt!. two III ":\ t- Is ut hit; \\·'ntrr homo Q.t "'Unml, Ii'h\' del' the JoZherrnH.ll law, or \\'h 
'l)ur1. on£! In !','W lor)..:, nt:~ In 1111110 H •. Herretary (jarrfMnll wIn srl~nd Chrlslnu~~ llr~ b('lng lnvf>t:lllgaU.d as a 1 a~tl Onl~!n tilt.' ."I~tr"'t or Coll1nlhl:t. :lP-( DOl)' \vlOt hl:i bruth0t. at ~ler('hantvlll~ to pl·pbahh." pl'URc/'lItion. UTI 
r,jvJ. 1-1'./' Stat,· l):lflk~ HPPUf'd of 1-:-;' .1.. nnrl Itltf'l' will t-i)1(>IHl u r"w tln'~ O\'Cr t.'at·h other. fiJ.;uratl\'f'l:, 
1\'hkh 011(> 'jj"l! it- iI~ {·ali!"l,l'lli;l. ROllth i with .\tr ..... 1;.lI·riI-lOIl :It AthnUt" C'U)y In tht." (.f(Ul.t to ohtuln !mlll"'.-rll.r(lI.'~l:t. T. ~:.t:--, :'llril"'ollrl. aU_II ,,'i~r'nn- i ~'~f'l"ptal'\' T)anio'!~\ will filllu' til ~'V;~!ih~ J"I('('r~ uf ttw ll<,p:,rtmt'nt of.J 
',Ill. 1"0. : .. I\"IIH~.~ 1.':1 Tlk!l n:fttJ': appll('a- I i!lr;tnTl. hut will lat ... r ;-,;111.'11,1 "l few ~Ia's that this h,; the l·n~('. TId".' 
t'llll, alllI I)(dh ill·t.' HltTHtf,(l III t ~illfnrilla. In, Halelh'h. :-.:. {'. } 1IJ(llllrh~:.a ha\'~ bt..t'n Jnlltl,~, 
'1'1Ir \ .... 'v "ur;: "\11.,1((·utI0"", .\11 {)ttll'r l·hi)illt·t Oftif'f'I'S will .11nt~ at that t'ulnhln:ttlorls at'(~ an:\.lou 
ThrPtl applkatl(n~ lIa\'''' h"I'1I )'('('(·\\(,11 tllj'ir hUTIJ('H iwrn wIth thl"' ('x('I'ption or fuin how ~h'i~' llU1Y ('ondul.t 
~rom nollnnal b:tll\<1-1 in tilt· ~tatl' of !':f'W Attol·JI(.y fj(,llf'r'ul ~'f'H"Ynl")l'lH, whu will n'·~.s wlthollt danl-:('r or ].'I"I!, 
York flutl"ildf' of !'or:t·w York {·ity. 'l'wo l\a- spt.·ntl CllI'lHtrlJUS na~\ with his rnothcr ('utfun, liut In nu ('aMP, It \\a' 
'1 I at Ell(tun. K.\·. nlh'"ht. hUll un:.' (>orporatioll 
. cna hl\nlt:s of !'-:t· .. • York I ~Ily ha.\·(" ajl- \\"lllhl;':-Ht'~~ ttl rcor~anlz(! ~, 
,.,li"d-lh,. l1nr·rlt"all. ,,·lth III (~:ll'ltal nlld ------ lu.te! down hy tIre Attornt')' 1 
,url'lu~ (,f ~1.h.").(i(.'. alHI tl1" (:ofhnm. TREE CRASHES ON AUTO ~,"('Il admit that lhdr atcu 
...-ith .u ('ul'1tal ;\lltl I-'Hrplu:-4' of ~:lqO.Ofkl. --______ • ~~~~3Jui:tmf~n~;O~~{~11~, ~~~~·.I,l/( 
Tiw ][1111~Hll\ Trll<;( ('prnpalq' nf "!':t·W Dr. and Mrs. Bcattre Have Narrow l'orhlltlulJ, at' ttH_' Jh').:flUatloll~ 
Yc'rj( ··\ty :dt-'Il f.·lt·~I'Hpll!,,1 It:' :qqlllt'a- Escape When. Locust Falls. ~:~·I!I~~~~·lInltt'~I"~:I'r~~;:·~.lt~at.~~t,,\)~~ I~un. 'flw \l~l-;';tal" ltallk" 1!:.ll 11 01 \'" :1;1- ! I f"!:l~d art' tLf' l"!r.~t ~.Itil'tl;d I,,. ~i~ rt.... TII' .• 1. T[, l!I.':Lttie :111,1 hi!:! w!t\. \\,fT~.) ~}~;'~·a~I~~llt~;:~·~~~~:.ulI;!allOn uf 
---... ---.----. _____ ...: __ ..:.:..:;..:;~'~,~'~.:..-:..' "::"~'~':..' '::"~" __ ""~"" ,,:' ~:7:-.o._ i 1'Idin;.; fn t!lI' fl'(J!ll !;,.,;~t ,',f' th',i: a\ito~ 1.,.,~;1I1;~i·!,~;:.ll\li;,~111l~:,lf.~~.I~~,~)\;~~aL/. 
.-
to 125th St. 
Fir~·proof. 
de Rooms. 
I t".li,. :(1.·0 l,.'r ,11\)', 
I I·, t Ii. :f"!. ;,11 I'",r ,I •• y. 
t \', 1:'1'11 ,,'\('\.11\ 
.: :::! ~ I,P" :--.111 :-.:\;:~ 
•• . I ., I" t ~ I 
Month .lid SIt,unn. 
.l;J ,',,\ Oi .. : J~',:.!~ 
I II'''; .~ 1.;"'1)1..1 
" I', \: \ \ !', 'I~ 
f •• r .!illll,·r l'ill'l i .. ". 
: " \' \~'\ ;EI;'. 
h1ulh"UlUlf" di ... tu" .. of 
111 rl'ur_'tl h) r .. ul 
'1111 ,'lin a:rl lh('n~ 
HUlllll. ",\rf Ctt",CI 
1111 • .1",,0 '-""", ~4\Hlh~ 
""'\ U" 4lt'\lt IOU" ulul 
~."t':n~~'.I.~"("4'"'' lIC t h'.~ • 
WJlf'tnllln •..•••••••. , ..••... - ••• ~ ... ~ .... ,~ ....... 
tl.,,'e111rtlt41t ('(lm!H\nlp~. or w1'd('h lhr~e \vhlch wilt continue untlJ G()ngrOHfJ re .. 
t!e In ·rUn". tine I" TN",""""., on" tn lUi"ul~lblt1i On.-JIUl. 12 .. Secretlll'}' lJr),lln 
'l'\rJ1nlu. Oil' In ~i"ryl:hiil:- two r;,·~tl.- I. tit IIIH Wlntl'r homo ut 1.lInml. 1'111..; 
1'\",1. ',M In N'w Tnrk. on~ In 11111101". HCt'rl!tllry (1:u'rIMon will 8r~ntl ChrlRlmtlM 
An«1 on(' In tllfl' tllfltril·t or Columhla, nf'- nay with hlK hrotll~I' a.t :"lerC-hR.nlvUlt!. 
rl!"d l'I\'11 :-;1.11,' h:.nk!ot H"pll.~(l· (If 1:-':' .1., nnd Intt'l' will hpf>1ul a r(·w tlnY9 
~hldl 0111' fa.'lt i:, ill (',tlif(",rnin, .~olltll : with ~\fr~. 1;.I.I'ril-lhfl at ,\tlantl ... " City, 
r ur,,!tn:l, 1',':< a."". :\fl~.'"'II\'rl. :l1!!1 \\ I~·w(ln- :-:f~I·l'pl;lI·v T)anil'I~1 will dillo III \Vash-
t!!., TWI) ~ .. I\·in~!~ 1,:.nlHl mad,,> :qlp!i('ll- iIl~tnll, hut will lat,~r :--;peritl :'1. few Itay.!"! 
tiel, arid "HoI\} ,,1'1' f"ittl1df-ll ill 1';,dlf(Jfld:l. in,Hi.llt.:IJ..:'h. X ..... 
Thr".' appikatif'is 11;\\'(0 1\('1'11 I"('("t-I\·('II 
trl)m nntlnllHI b;tllk~ In tllt, !4tatr· ot' :-..:('''' 
York hut !-lId I' (If ~('\\' VHrk t·it~. 'I'wo 11"" 
tlenat hn.n~:i of S.''f.· Yorl< t :it.\' hu\'~ a.il-
rll,d-tho l1>u-rlm:lt1. with 1\ ('!lldl:1l nlill 
'\:rr,lu~ (,f ,fl,h:t).O('IIl, arlll tIll' f :(ltholl1, 
.... ith Ii ('Hp1Ial :.1111 fl1rp!tl:-l' of ~:~1)O,~M.~I. 
,.j:(. lfwl:-1nn Trll"'t. t"ptnpall;'· of !\"I'\V 
ic'r:c ('Uy a\!'!(1 t,·lt·~I'u.pll('~1 It:' 
4\11 nthf'f t:al)iut·t nf1ir'.~r~; will c.1lrw :1t 
l1wII' hOflH'~ h"%'I~ with th,.. (,XCt~ptlon or 
Attol'I\('~' (;(':Wfid ~Tr'HI·YnnldH. Who will 
,.;rwnd C!1t'!S{IIIUS !Jay with hlH JHothcr 
at Ell(tun. l\:y. 
TREE CRASHES ON AUTO. 
Dr. and Mrs. Be:tttle Have Narrow 
Escape When Locust Falls. 
'~url. 'fh~,' \l\I-~tat'· \t;ulk-l t!l.lt h;(\·p :l!,a 1 T)I' . .T n. n",lIlle :I!l.\ hIs ",\If __ • \\'q,> 
Ti:,II:d :111' tLn F:r, .. t :\dtillll;~l ~,I i"~_I'u.-, lidln;; III '''' f)jolll ,~.;,t ,)F t!'('lr auto. 
t~!H. with!l ('fI\oil:tl 1l1'1! ~Un"\;,'" "I ;">",tl,_ 
(('I); the' Fll'~~ :'\:ll:oIIW! .. ~ ('{IIIPP!'-:tU\;IJ. 
'fr:th, t:!.-,U,('ld ,'npltnl HIJd ~qlJ·l'lll~'. alld 
t~(' Flr:-;t Xatlnn:lj 01' IJOUi.;'~lh\·'·I'--::'_'. 
Jll(lidll! fl (,:n I r:l'i~lll~~,'; to I}\.ill)~ F'~tTY nt 
,~, (I',.jfwk ::,.~tl·l·Ja:.· a~·tt·rn(Joll. when a 
ltl\'u~r tr':'I: :-;lxty ft~(!t tall. which stont! 
in. a l'n\\" (It' l(wtlstH H'\"crul feet above 
"ilh '1t~',flrlf) cu.r-Ital and fHlrplu.'·. tlir. roadway: suddl"nl:r toppled unt! tl!'ll 
All tit". n:ttl.')llal balll\:i (,r I)f~l\\·~'I·. Wll~l witll a {,l'a!'3h nCI'o!':1 the highway. Tho 
t!':t' t:xapt\or. "r tlll' Fir:-;t :-::ttion~ll. tl'lml( strut"k tlw reaT )";ct or tho auto-
~~,.(, t(l!,'g'rnpllt'd npplkuilollt'. nlOhit.~, (,I'l1llJIlling It flat a~nLlnst the 
'r~l~gral1ll'l W('fO r('l"d\'~d from H.ll ..;ix roa<1 awl stopping- tho n1u('hlne in its 
or lho nat\otloll hanK:"! ill ... \tl.-t!lta, ~ ~n .. tra'.'1[s. 
lJeen rumor. (lint corporallonH. WI> 
hn.ve been sued _ by tho Government 
del' the ~hermH.n' law, or whose nff; 
nri) \wlnlt Inv~.tlgat~d III 1\ \lrelimln 
to III'pb!lhl~ In'o,,c''lI\ton, nr" tunHI 
O\'er l~uc.'h otht.'rr fij.:turntlvply t-i p,..u 1\ 
ill th~ dfo,'( tn oilluin !rl1ll1unlty. 
t'I .... C'fS uf thl~ D£'partnll-nt ot .Tu.::;tien I~ 
that thi!'! II-' tlie ('n~('O. Ttl!':! :l(lmit : 
Inquirl(,!-I: havt'! 1>('('1\ madt', hHlka 
that l'olnhtnatlons arc nn:-..io\1s to a.~. 
tain how t}Hi.:" lnny con.luL't thdr t 
njOss without dang-fOr or F'~'deral PI' 
('ution, hut in no CUM"'" it wa:i stal,'~ 
nlg'ht. hnd nn'y ('urporatloll :-.huw 
williHr:rH~:!li to reorganize :'Ilon~ 1 
laid down hy the Attornl')' Gt'}wr:tl 
"\'('11 numlt that Ih!'lr affair" r~' 
Tt·ndJul'ltm~nt. 'rhe ~cw Hu,Vt'U J 
roa.d I~ fL pO~Rtbl(' t'X{"~T)tlon to 
cOlllHtlun. a~ til ... 1h.·goUatiunM C'olldll 
ht>twCf'1I ttH rt"pr(,s"ntatl\,~j4 anti til,' 
hH'n~· .. • n~'rl(~ral IW\,t· an lU~f'H wll 
\ lp\~ if.' tli,' rt·u,·g-lL1dzat!oll 01' that tl 
lwnatlun r;yslcm. . 
.\t tilt, ~HIll" tll1h~, ~ill' !"itnatit.":1 IHJt. 
~\dtnillb.tl".l!i(lll vl,'w-poillt 1)01 \ I'i',\ 
('IIuI·lIglnJ!. l'r·j'·.··d·h·ttl \\'il~olJ j.'lt~ 
:d~ t"i"!Ilurk:.s In!it idKIH to thoSt,' wlio 
IIt's~l;;,1 hlN appl'o\'ul or lht< Itt:W ('urI 
law to L\· hltp f'lu·{·((,11 as Uti ("xl)n'~,'i1 
vdlltngnt'!-\j on thp. p~rt of thf>' Adll 
tration to 11' ,t hi,; ulJ~lnt"s:; 1utt· 
half way in allY df"1-lire on tlH·lr p;\ 
arrant.{(! their affairs and rn(·tho( 
0TJ\'TcLtloli .YO us to c.:Ollrnrm to th~ , 
or thr .. l)l'partnH"nt of Ju:,nieC'. '1'11;.1 
tllvit.lttoll will be a<"t~ .. ptl"d somp ott' 
dn Tiot doubt. hut jU:-it at thl!'! thnt' 
do nut feel justlft..-d in s~tyin~ tlw 
tllq\ltrl~H rf'l·,·tvf'd 'rorll f'Orpor/1 
flhoull) be tal(t~n ttH dlrt·, .. t nrl't'l':i III 
the Uov{'rnmt'nt'» virtual (It:mand:-
'I'll. ahrupt halt tiu'nw Dr. an.l :-.[,'., 
f'omrner<"ih1 Inlt'r"!'lt.'i t,ll' Atlanta I\r.~ lIl1- n"attie hadt n,;ainst tho T('ar or thf'lr 
Gerah)oll to 1.11' .1I1X1UIIl'4 to ~lll\'1' that· fty !H\at~ and UII.'}' \\'fOro e1ublwd a.nd 
~"fhrnnt("d o1~ ('III" of th{' }'t·g-inn ... l I t!-! s(,J"atdlf'd h,· ~orur~ or tho large hrnncht"3. 
'''.0 bank dll,'.. i uut Ih'ill1<": <I',," "~rlo\l~ly hurt. Shoe Machinery Officials 5il, 
Th~ lurg:,·,:.l h;lllk thll~ fur Ul·ph·iJl).:' I.; I The "lIlba.T11(IlI~nl in which the Io{'u:.;t I~OHTO~. D('c. !!-1.-\Yllf·n ask('. 
t~'fI ,ContlTh'tltlil :llld l'OIIlI1It'I','lId :-:,\- I "'liS root..:-d hLt!l bc{'n underrninl"d by the da~· {'on('('rniu~ a l'f'{Wrt that till' 
tlonal of {~hk;li.~(J. III' wllkh (:"01'1;(-': ;\1. ~ rain or TlII'RIiav nb;ht nnd th~ tI'ee had I ('TIl1Tlf'nt anI.! thp enlt.Pd ~ho.~ ).tad 
r.tYllold~ i~ l'I'I"~'t,h'Ht. Hs \'llplta1 .tn<1 ~tC.Hl(1 t(ltl~rlng" thl'uugh th,~ uny. Engl- ~l(~r:;iH~rr'tt~~(,~I;:i~~i71(~~1~1[1!11~/~l~I~~rt 
I'lTpluiIl tllLI! *::"I.~,U),O"O, '1'111" only nlllt'r, Jlq·t,'i w(:rp H"nt out ]Ilt,~ ln thf! .aftCr-ll~nit'.(l. ~ldnl'Y \\~. \\'In:-tlow, Pn .. 
('Melt';", halllt fOl~\\'llldlllh''' 1111 :IPIIlI(';l-' 1I00n til Jnnk" ~uro IJ( thf' lwcurlty or of' tllf~ c'nrnpun~', :dl1t1 tH" had h.~ar. 
II I .. . I It I' n.>~orllltICJIt~ We ft" lIn(Jpr WIJ\'. III I~n ,a t:\(.~,.:--;'lttllr\,(l 11:\111\ .. I 1)1' . l' PII)-, otlu'r ]O("U:;IH III ttJ(' f'HLI1H' row.. 1'1 rrf.d Inq\Jlrll'~- to hiM .'OUI11-I1:1. (" 
1,1, \\lth ~".41t~1 U)!;) l aptt:d alit! ~t11 \/llI!i,... j 1" l'hnat.', attorru"y fnr thf' ("11m 
. Olle '1IItH'",d,.',"'I( ur ;-.; .. \\' (111,'allo h"" iASKS PRAYER FOR A REUNION! ,.,\I,l that I." l'r~r"",-p,1 not (0 dle('11 
,IP:'lt",I-~tl." '\l,1t:I:'\' t·t'ntr~~l. lht',IH.I~- ~'.' ___ ~'_"_ ,m.Htcr. 
py. ·lm.llk·ll1· Lot1h!:!!!'I. "1111 :t .. · .. \jJUu.l . , _. ". . . '. ARRANTS OUT FOR CO 
a,,\ '1"1.1,., "" >1."."."", i E.nd of Family Differences. a Christ· W . 
Jt.IUntur' .. · .. ~~l"'H"rUU" ItIl""'l'nn"~. 1 mas Text. I -----th'\'~'11 11:lIjol.:.\ 11:1111,:-1 of Halt!rl1ort.: An old wan. tll,nll WhO,sl' 11l:C£" tlu,,:; Countess S:lnta Eulalia Ch 
h'-,e l ... I"~l'ltphl.~l .lpp:kalllolIS, \\trh a \ Y"ars had l~'ft Ilwjr tl'~n'(,'~, UII(l WhO!"Cl; Him with Crfmlnal LI~1e1 
tt':r.h!llt:ll \':lptLII and ~tlrp!u'j /)1' $l~,-l11I'l1ltl .. r ~11O\\'rd tl\l' n'fhlt'lIwnt o( an t:p- I .1.;1>f'(o;'Jl if) 7'11(. ~''''r Yl1rl: T'rll( 
\.~,~ .... J. },'h ... 1 :~111 huot ,. 1I;l t \"n 11 ",I~l\"~~ I l,.'lngln,l: 111 all olcl-faHhlont'd AnH'rlcan I I'J fILA PELPlll A. ))('e. :"!'L-(i_ 
''''''Ytt 1.1 h· It •. l:d 11'01':' Tilt' :\tllll;,l,'y ,l!lITIIl', wHD·:l.'d with rather Ill'sitallt Htt'P:~tt!tsnll unci hiM IflOUler. 111t' c"o 
7,!'".!t't C\)~\:I\,\:I\- lit l:.~~lilll\)I'~· :1:--'0 ap-: lI:to 'flU! TL\It:~; 4..1ft'k~· Y.':il(·rdIlY. ~\'lth I S,lnta Eulalia. ffornwl'ly :\11':-4. Ju 
~.~~J. ~"llh' ern\J.IT'!·a"',"';llIt'!lt. ):.,. ll<llillp~l III a i Ht ... t:-;mt.) hu\,(' ohl:dned \\'Hrt<lnt:o-: 1 
'rht: ~"\l'1111 :nrh\,~ll.,\I:~I:I.d 11:111K :-:t·ek-' idtt.:f, I'Xl,)aildn~ t~J;lt Il.~ was (ltu' or ;arJ'(.~t 01' ::\1. Hlair 4.."nRII.,un tll~ dl:t 
b:, to b,. ~H!1tI1ltl'd is. t!\t. ~h:"\ !nut c.~f: til.· t"" pt'r!-'()II~ 1',·ft'l'n·d to In it. and' ('rlmlnnl l1bC'\ Tht~ uC'tllJ1\ Is bn~L'1 
P~.~t?n. fI! "·lJil'h "'Hli.ntl .\, t;a ... ton is ~ th~lt h(, W;llltt~d to ('nll~t the hC"lp of aU! Jnh'rv!t'w:i 'dh'K~ct to ue false and 
~~Jldt'ItL lt~ "l\}Ittal 41\11 ~\lrpll1~ lIb· i tilt' :-,1It'l1t prnYif'r:-4 (1;\ Christmas day to I ('loUH. J.:1\·l!'tl b)' CnUI1 to tho Phlltul 
r~~tat" ~q:I,t""',O'M). ~ ; ('ffel't :I I'runloll wldeh. ,,>omchow. had! n{'wsp."\flt"r~ und printf!'ci thiN mOf] 1n~ (.'·.lllt! ItHl'ld.!ol :\;H~d)'lil ('it\' 11allk 1 \It,>riNl his hungli:lI; human efforts iIndlgn:tnt nt th~ :.LMSertions or 
'~Grilll,' l~",pl,ltt. :,\lkh .. t.'h.graplll'd ~ tilr'llln..::lil)\lt tl\{' T1h'It,)' Y('UrH. who 1M nil In\'(,'MtI"ator nnd torm~r 
q:nttatuL, .. UIIII:-; to) ::'l'L'nof;\I'~- .\li·.\dOL) I 'fL.' l\.tttor, wrlttell In flrlf! but ~1ightly JlH.l'f"l' nlfin ot" tht.s c'tty, that 11 :~u r.~kt_ II to hi' Ht:mlltt'd H' lIl'·lllh,·I'- tJ t lIlu1011~ }mll<1wrltlnJ:, was h('ad~d .• ,A I tit-en c1nployed by ).(r. Htptson to 1 ~,tp. It 1:1 th~' lan~\'~.t Iltutorml hUllk in ~tt'I'l'Y ~Incl Happy l:hrj~tmus," nnll sald: n revolution in l'ortul{al. ~o tho 
:t,~t (,'&It \It :\lkh:g:lll. with a .... qlit.d '1'(1 th,. l;dft(J1" t l! '[hI' XCIC l"t)rJ,' 1'irnt· .• ': might bt.:<,onlf' QueE'1l ot that ('( 
. ltd ~l:q);lIoj flf ;:\1.:"'\II.'.Oll). \'I'~'I~ ttll,... tt~, 1HOlt~ Utll\'Hs.J.1tr ('el~~ thtj Count~~ti ~nt('ret1 an emphatlc 
-'-11 the Cl(4ar\n~ 1{oUSt' ban~b or l":an- r.~;tt;\~'r\\~l!{,tl~.,~l;;=t c.!~~~~n ~~nttoheth)~;ll~ot:I"~ to the cha.n:f's to-day. 
au Cltr, ~tl\., a:hl J.(all:'Oa~ City. Knn., \hut flt'roliGh HIS liff' and tntf'r~·t""i~n nil to I nm astonished that an}' on£' 
'fillll"d. ]. om' of th<- pig-itt nntiol1al 'IH'II l'l!'wul<t ht !'I1L\'e\1-(,hrhlt 1:t l~',-,. Ther" sufrlclent h~tt-rf'st in thJs case tl ~ka af !'t. LotllR dh1 ItlH,wIH<". Orw o( I t~~lIt~· l~~I~'h~'I\\~N!.\\'~'''t~~~:' ~~\~;c-~~: a.o~:r~:& tlon me about it," said th6 Co' ~~ is 1ht· H.ln,k fir ,,'omnWrl"f', 01'" yf'OlI •• ,1(1. chI' 4'Ult"r In thl" hUt I~('''de or "It I .. tho nloRt rldlt'ulou!I thing 
ar(ta· I '1 t k ..: I I (hI' ('h::!1I1f'1'. Th.,y hav," t.,.,." I"s'runlf"d tor 1-' I I .. llat tIna lall In, t. ~uul~, with I mlln), ,I'arl'. 31thnugh r('l~ul(",.t ~,:r('rUI ha\'e helirtl or. I ShOll u aUJ.;"h u,t It 
{,S,l)tt.tl awl SlIrt,luI" «\1 *,l:':.t"''.l''~). Tnt" i h"'11 11\..1'\':' l.y t'1I.~ 1~1O( 1\ tf"UHjl1n II!I \l( If It Wt'!'(" nl\t that lht, ('ouut i.:; 
lI!'t(lHHlh,' ~.:tthn1l1,l l~ank. of \\ I:i,~h: ,')1\\llh,"".) o1a\'s !-1'I.)\Il.t lttl\f' ,'\w('t:'. Tlu'!'Io1j ttl hu\'(~ plotte-d iiJ.:'a.ln.st lds own ,'I ~(.ttua J. \Ynl1t> ts l·r~s\llt'nt. Id~o ,tp· i ;·t~:::'~I't~ .. ~u:,~ll~t-~';~::~ \'.~:'tlf"vtl/\.~~~::\I~~~ t~~'t~l~~ Th~ r.ount lu\!~h('d u.nd dl~mls:, 
tiJ~, It:t L'nl~ltal 1L11l1 ~Urtll!l~ h.lul $~.-: m ... \. .\11 haYf' rA!II"J charh't's 'wht'n Wt" flPOttl~ ahout lilt 
1,{fJ.1))) T". .' l \ .. II n~kIlJ': tull na:.('h that ("hur"ll;:::(,)~r" 
C<! • oll' 1111rd -:\at!Oll:\l. "Ith .:)l._ i \.)\ \Hl t!111'o Ci~rl __ tnlll!c in th"lr ~lI"nl pr.l}-.:"rtl ni~ht, Ever}" onC' '\'ho knowH hir ~.fX-) (":}.J,ltal ,IUld ~lIrl'l\l~. Ilnd th,' :\u-; ~h;tll )or"" t!led r.1n~lI}' .. Ht!Cft'n .. 't'!I "yt' lLll tz(>~ thnt he I.i lIot the kind of r 
trJ .... I Hank or \\'\'n!'lt~)n o( ~t. I.ou1s, i ~h.,;1 b~ t'o:'FNa'!n? S. T. I... plot fur II T(I>\'olution 0" fur ar 
~tt. $~;,.("')\ ("llpitaliz.tli()n, n~ Wf'1t .lfl' ( 'The old nUln 1('rt. the If'ttcr, thanked unpl~a.snnt. Tht' COllnt is for Pt'"~1 
~~' 11 ;.ullttlf\ Tru:tt Cl\!l1pany ullIl the Tn!: Ttll1~e (or l\ublt:thln~ 1t. and. walked J:'ooct ortlpr. not for a rC'\'oluthHl ; ;.l~ \ l·I\.(,n 7'na .. t and ~astll;;:i t'om~ wllh lI;;htl~r ~tt.>(l out or the ·orrlce. or~nntz{"d J:o\'t"l'nnlent. l'li' I or ~t. !..ou1:l.. uPSlll\'d. ~~. ' ~tl1~·\\~~:~a:"it\~~I~it\'\f }'~,t::;;l~~;i Greater Sail Area for Defender. kl:~~.e~:o~~l~I~;~ ~U:t::;lt~l~l~::: ~~:f: 
t!\:~'o 'JS of ~"").),4~'III. ~~ ... k'l·d t,') L.! Itt- lilUt'l"!"\'L. H, t., I>t"I,,'. :!.a.-Tbe Y3nuerbllt to the statenl~nt.s ot that nUlU. 
Y31't.t tHl"· bU~h!lrl.l: I.t':-~ a9 a randhh .. te fur, nothill~ \\'h!ltc\,E'r Rollout nlY S\)!l' 
~h,t"TlhK Iroll\ OhIo. :t~'. d~!"Ii",'" 1..:: At:'I'~ka.f!; ~up h t.J have :Ito I Unn:i ~Vith htm, if. jndt"t'J. he Ii, 
1.\lIOliI.l,1 h<l.n\.\~ ot (~1111.>illllati, , .. lut~r I'll,l 0..('11 tha I ",as.at ftnt pro1.~!t~ .. lf, hU.I!'Jnetis with him ll'lt I do nut 
nd('l' tnt' 1 to 1 ~ "li' t \t wu., II "'!"'~e" t'1-nl ... h!. '1 h.it l!'t .aId to bo, . • t! n H':i:'l a ~'-l'd;'J":~ r:"'~~"~'::· :~i"~\O: th". rt~~.!\lll ,r\.'f ~:l'~ ('han,-:(' In l,tftl':.I nlreauy to:'l- I i1o:" 1n"lultl ('\'(;" WJJ:~g\'st ::ilal,;h a 
'lhl'~~h!p 'l'h~ll. (,:. ~ilHI H,;.i: r..lunf'nl, t,y wt:dl :t,.!dltlulla.l b.l1l3~t Is :0 1 tl:~,lt n,a~ spokt, ('I. l't.·~:tt., f .. 'tI.::IMI,( ..... '. ,,\11 (,( 1211.' Ill .. ('orrtp,j L,n ttl~ I{('t" I, Inste"'ll or tn"ldo I The (ount Is tnt~'rf'.~h'\l fn Jt 
---,~ ..... _-.- I t:H\ y~dH. Thta 't'u.ent ot' tho pro,poMCl MUI ,,0}('1)' to prODJoto Its weI tar'!!' .. 
\tIuntr'c.l ou )181((" :.:. l!~aeu.:ll': h~ n..:: a~t!O:Jn':N" hal'pine::;s or IUs PI!ODl~:' 
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